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ABSTRACT 
Continued climate change and minimum ice conditions over the past several 
years is allowing for increased maritime activity in the Arctic, which may lead to 
potential homeland security/defense missions. In January 2009, the U.S. 
government acknowledged the probability of these missions with an updated 
Arctic Region Policy, which highlighted the need to develop capabilities to protect 
U.S. air, land and sea borders, military/civilian vessels and aircraft, maritime 
commerce, critical infrastructure and key resources. Successfully supporting 
these missions will depend on a coherent understanding of all the activities 
taking place in the Arctic region. Achieving this level of “situational awareness” 
will only be possible when all equity partners and stakeholders are sharing 
relevant information. This thesis examined three popular information-sharing 
models, Alaska Information Analysis Center, Joint Interagency Coordination 
Group, and the Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection to determine 
which would work best for a broad array of Arctic partners and stakeholders. The 
thesis' research and analysis shows that none of the models are sufficient or 
stand-alone; rather a megacommunity is necessary, consisting of all equity 
partners interfacing with the stakeholders, managed by leaders that will motivate 
the community to achieve a high degree of awareness for all Arctic activity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
On January 29, 2009, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
25/National Security Presidential Directive 66 (HSPD 25/NSPD 66) Arctic Region 
Policy was issued. Geographically, this policy covers approximately one sixth of 
the earth’s landmass; more than 30 million km2 and includes two major shipping 
lanes (Arctic Council, 2009). The area spans 24 time zones with a population of 
about four million, including over 30 different indigenous peoples and dozens of 
languages (Arctic Council, 2009). In addition to the United States, Russia, 
Norway, Canada, Iceland and Denmark also have defense, homeland security 
and resource interests in this region; some of these are conflicting territorial 
claims as shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1.   Territories and Claims Within the Arctic Circle (From The Scramble 
for the Seabed, 2009) 
According to the chairman of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, there 
are four forces of change leading to an “accessible Arctic.” These include 
climate, technologies (e.g., transport, satellite communication, navigation, remote 
sensing), global demand for Arctic resources, and Arctic residents reaching to 
improve life (Treadwell, 2009, p. 37). One example of the accessible Arctic can 
be seen in the amount of activity, as shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.   Arctic Activity (From Ellis, 2009, p. 8) 
HSPD 26/NSPD 66, the fourth policy iteration, brings awareness to the 
potential impact that these accessibility “forces” have for all, including those with 
malevolent intentions. Accordingly, the government added the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to support homeland security (HLS) missions, in 
addition to the homeland defense (HD) missions that the Department of Defense 
(DoD) had been responsible for since the first policy. The new policy highlights 
the need to develop capabilities to protect U.S. air, land and sea borders, 
military/civilian vessels and aircraft, maritime commerce, critical infrastructure 
and key resources in the Arctic region. The complexity in supporting this policy 
can be viewed through a cursory lens of economic, political/military, scientific 
activities and interest in the area.  
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1. Economics 
The total mean undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources of the 
Arctic are estimated to be approximately 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (U.S. 
Geological Survey, 2008). For comparison, worldwide consumption of petroleum 
products was 82.3 million barrels a day in 2004, with the top three consumers 
being the United States (20.7 million), China (6.4 million) and Japan (5.4 million) 
(U.S. Energy Information Administration [USIA], 2010).  
In 2007, the U.S. maintained a similar consumption rate (average of 20.7 
million barrels of oil a day), approximately 40 percent of that (9.29 million) was for 
motor vehicles (USIA, 2010). Americans used more oil for their motor vehicles 
than the total combined amounts of Russia, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
France (Public Broadcasting Service [PBS], 2010) The U.S. represents about five 
percent of the human population but consumes a quarter of the world's oil (PBS, 
2010). U.S. petroleum consumption dropped slightly in 2008, to 19.4 million 
barrels, still a considerable amount considering that the country only produced 
4.95 million barrels of crude oil per day (USIA, 2008). Motor gasoline 
consumption that year continued to be high at 8.9 million barrels/378 million 
gallons a day (USIA, 2008). The important point to note is the steady U.S. 
appetite for oil, which could be a driving factor for Arctic exploration.  
In order to obtain the rights to these undersea Arctic resources, the 1982 
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty must be ratified. After 
that, each signatory nation has 10 years to map the seabed. Those maps, along 
with sediment samples and other scientific information, can be used to claim 
parts of the seabed that are extensions of the continental shelf of each nation. 
Rear Admiral (RADM) Brooks, former Commander of US Coast Guard District 17 




The Convention guarantees our military and transportation 
industries critical navigation and overflight rights, U.S. fishermen 
exclusive fishing out to 200 nautical miles, and much, much more. 
In the view of the Coast Guard, the Convention for the Law of the 
Sea greatly improves our ability to protect the American public as 
well as our efforts to manage our ocean resources and to protect 
the marine environment. (Brooks, 2009)  
Even though the U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS, it continues to map the 
Arctic area along with other nations attempting to define their territory and the 
resources contained therein. The economic as well as national security 
importance of the region is depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.   Potential Future Arctic Shipping Routes (From Treadwell, 2009, p. 
18) 
2. Political/Military 
In addition to the UNCLOS treaty ratification, several political incidents 
over the past few years have heated up the region. For example, according to 
the London Times, in 2007 the Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, 
“ordered military ships to the Arctic amid growing tensions with both the United 
States and Russia over competing territorial claims in the region” (Blomfield, 
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2008). The same article claims that “Russia has raised the stakes in the 
international scramble for the Arctic by announcing it will boost its military 
presence in the region to protect its ‘national interests’” (Blomfield, 2008). The 
willingness of Russia to incur the high risk of planting a flag on the North Pole 
seabed in 2007 was another sign of political interest that raised the attention of 
several Arctic neighbors (Struck, 2007). 
The investments made by Russia in their fleet of 25 polar icebreakers (six 
active heavy icebreakers, two heavy icebreakers in caretaker status, 15 other 
icebreakers, and two additional icebreakers leased from the Netherlands) points 
toward their commitment to operating in the Arctic (O’Rourke, 2010). Compare 
these numbers with Finland and Sweden, who each have seven polar 
icebreakers, Canada with six and the two owned by the U.S., both of which are 
currently inoperable due to age and mechanical condition (O’Rourke, 2010). Add 
to the mix the Chinese, who also have an icebreaker, sailing most recently 
across the Arctic Circle on July 21, 2010 (Xinhua News Agency, 2010). 
Interestingly, this same ship, the Xue Long, surprised the Canadians when it 
landed at Tuktoyaktuk in 1999 (Teeple, 2010, p. 52). Such activity signals the 
multinational interest in the region, even by “non-Arctic” nations. 
Such political interest was also alluded to in the summary of the 2008 
Arctic Climate Change and Security Policy Conference Report, which stated:  
Security concerns and issues were not the pressing factor driving 
Arctic policy. Questions remain however over U.S. and Russian 
positions and the use of symbolic gestures for political purposes. 
The government must consider these possibilities as part of the 
larger strategy... 
The Arctic is currently experiencing rapid systemic change with 
multiple economic, social, political and security implications that are 
still imprecisely understood. Whether this plays out among the 
states and parties concerned through international cooperation, or 
competition and possible conflict is a vital and debated question. 
(Yalowitz, Collins, & Virginia, 2008, p. 5) 
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In 2009, RADM David Gove, oceanographer/navigator for the U.S. Navy, 
recognized the political/military tension and provided his view of national and 
homeland security interests in the region:  
Competing claims dealing with the Arctic are often political in nature 
and have important implications. For example, in the summer of 
2008 Canada announced that it would increase its military 
presence in the region, begin construction of a deep-water port on 
Baffin Island, establish a cold weather training base at Resolute 
Bay, and build six new ice-hardened ships to patrol the Northwest 
Passage. During the same period, Russia conducted strategic 
bomber flights over the area for the first time since the end of the 
Cold War. 
U.S. naval interests will face new challenges in an increasingly ice-
free Arctic with a strategic objective to understand potential threats 
to the United States from the maritime domain. As throughout the 
global commons, the U.S. Navy must be aware of activities that 
could be harmful to national security interests in a region that will, 
no doubt, see fewer barriers to access by potential adversaries in 
the future. National and homeland security interests pertinent to the 
U.S. Navy in the region would include early warning/missile 
defense; maritime presence and security; and freedom of 
navigation and over-flight. (Gove, 2009) 
Figure 4 shows the extent of the 2008 summer transits in the Bering 
Straits. This data provides insight into the amount of traffic that could lead to 




Figure 4.   2008 Bering Straits Transits (From Treadwell, 2009, p. 34) 
The political sparring between countries continued in 2010 as noted in the 
following excerpts from news articles: 
Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon on Thursday accused 
the Russians of "playing games" with a plan to deploy paratroopers 
to the North Pole this spring.” (Canwest News Service, 2010) 
The minister was also sensitive about intelligence reports that 
suggested the Russians might upstage Canada and other countries 
vying for a piece of the Arctic by dropping paratroopers at the North 
Pole in the days or weeks ahead. (Struzik, 2010) 
Russia is interested in joining Chinese developers to exploit oil and 
gas reserves locked in the Russian section of the Arctic, regional 
officials said. Dmitry Kobylkin, the governor of the Yamalo-Nenets 
Autonomous region in the Russian Arctic, expressed interest in a 
Chinese partnership in oil and gas development during the World 
Expo 2010 Exhibition in Shanghai. (United Press International, 
2010) 
These stories and reports are examples of recent political/military 
tensions; the weight these various claims carry is open for debate. The bottom 
line is that there is significant multinational political/military interest and capability 
to operate in the region.  
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3. Scientific 
The level of scientific interest in the Arctic is less debatable. Over 40 
research programs, institutions, and organizations exist at the policy and 
operational levels (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 
2010).  A number of these are involved in the planning, coordination, and 
implementation of activities that are carried out in and around Alaska, the U.S. 
gateway to the Arctic (American Association for the Advancement of Science 
[AAAS], 2010). This number does not include other political and military 
organizations that are not conducting research per se but who have interest in 
the area. In addition, over 4000 Arctic researchers are listed in the Directory at 
the Arctic Research Consortium of the U.S. (Arctic Research Consortium, 2010). 
At the center of the Consortium is the U.S. Arctic Research Commission 
(USARC), established by Congress under the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 
1984. The Commission operates in conjunction with a federal Interagency Arctic 
Research Policy Committee (IARPC), established under the same legislation. 
IARPC provides for coordination among federal agencies and works with the 
Commission to establish an integrated national Arctic research policy. Finally, the 
Arctic Research Consortium of the United States (ARCUS), established as a not-
for-profit corporation in 1988, is intended to serve as a bridge between the 
advisory bodies such as USARC and IARPC and the organizations that are 
actually involved in research. This consortium is headquartered in Fairbanks, 
Alaska (Arctic Research Consortium of the United States [ARCUS], 2010). 
4. Increasing Arctic Activity and Potential Scenarios  




Figure 5.   2004 Arctic Maritime Activity (From Treadwell, 2009, p. 48) 
The Arctic Marine Shipping Association (AMSA) reported that same year 
that the only passenger vessels that traveled in ice-covered waters were the 
Russian nuclear icebreakers that took tourists to the North Pole, voyages they 
have been making since 1990 (Arctic Council, 2009, p. 78). This changed in the 
autumn of 2007, when the first cruise ship tourists sailed from Europe to Barrow, 
Alaska via the Northwest Passage, which had opened completely for the first 
time in recorded history (Bryson, 2008). The sudden arrival of 400 German 
tourists in the northernmost city in the U.S. (Barrow population is 4,054 (State of 
Alaska, n.d.)) surprised the townspeople as well as the U.S. Coast Guard 
(Bryson, 2008). 
Several different scenarios were possible during this voyage, including the 
loss of navigation, propulsion and/or need for medical evacuation. More alarming 
would have been a Titanic situation, such as what happened to the cruise ship 
EXPLORER in the Antarctic in November 2007 as shown in Figure 6 (Browley & 
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Revkin, 2007). Luckily, other ships were nearby and all 154 passengers were 
rescued safely. From a HLS/HD perspective, a rare but thought provoking worst 
case scenario: the Barrow cruise ship could have brought a potential weapon of 
mass destruction, or some other dangerous cargo/passengers to shore without 
detection.  
 
Figure 6.   Explorer Stuck in the Antarctic (From New York Times, 2007) 
The EXPLORER story and different scenarios presented are symbolic of 
current and future Arctic maritime activity, and the difficulties that coordinating 
and responding organizations will face. In addition to ferries, fishing vessels, 
cruise ships and other smaller vessels, the Arctic will host more bulk cargo 
carriers, oil tankers and liquid natural gas carriers. It is important to note that 
besides the reduction in ice, there are many events that could increase or 
decrease potential Arctic traffic, including the safety of other routes, oil prices, 
major Arctic shipping disasters, transit fees, maritime enforcement, escalation of  
maritime disputes and the catastrophic loss of the Suez or Panama Canals (Ellis, 
2009, p. 15).  
The findings from the four-year AMSA project cited another important 
concern when traffic does increase: 
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The current lack of infrastructure in all but a limited number of 
areas, coupled with the vastness and harsh environment, makes 
carrying out a response significantly more difficult in the Arctic. 
Without further investment and development in infrastructure, only 
a targeted fraction of the potential risk scenarios can be addressed. 
(Arctic Council, 2009, p. 186) 
One scenario, a large environmental disaster, already occurred in an area 
of Alaska, which is more easily accessed than the Arctic. One of the most 
expensive in U.S. waters, the 1989 Exxon spill of 10.8 million gallons of crude oil 
in Valdez cost $2.2 billion and required a massive response effort (Government 
Accounting Office [GAO], 2007, p. 1). However, what many consider a major 
event ranks as the thirty-five largest by volume for all spills since 1967 on the list 
of international tanker spills (GAO, 2007, p. 1). Even if drilling in the Arctic is 
halted/stymied by the backlash from the latest “Deepwater Horizon” oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico, as long as the demand for petroleum remains, oil tanker traffic 
could continue to traverse the Arctic via the shorter shipping lanes where 
response and cleanup challenges are considerably greater.  
According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “The 
2009 summer minimum [ice] is the third-lowest recorded since 1979. It was 0.6 
million km2 greater than 2008 and 1.0 million km2 above the record low in 2007” 
(Menge & Overland, 2009, p. 10). This information indicates that the ability to 
operate in the Arctic appears to be sustainable at least through the summer 
months. Some experts believe that, as noted above, “large-scale damage to the 
Arctic environment from transportation accidents, energy development, fishing, 
tourism, and the long-range transport of pollutants from the South pose greater 
immediate threats than classic security issues” (Yalowitz et al., 2008, p. 24). 
Regardless of the original intent, any increase in human activity could generate 
homeland defense/security and civil support missions that would require 
immediate response and/or protection.  
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5. Summary 
While there are various theories regarding climate change causes and 
precise dates and times of when the Arctic will be ice-free, continued climate 
change and minimum ice conditions over the past several years suggest that it is 
not unreasonable to expect increased maritime activity at least during the 
summer months. These activities will likely include research and exploration 
expeditions for seabed mapping, natural resource exploration and extraction, and 
military, commercial and cruise ship traffic. Corresponding to these activities are 
potential HLS/HD missions including domain awareness, freedom of 
navigation/mobility, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, environmental 
protection and search and rescue. Successfully supporting these missions will 
depend on a coherent understanding of the activities taking place in the Arctic 
region. Achieving this level of “situational awareness” will only be possible when 
all equity partners and stakeholders are sharing relevant information.  
In essence, the “status quo” problem is that, from a political, military, 
scientific and economic perspective, the organizations responsible for supporting 
homeland defense and security activities in the Arctic are not sharing information 
in a way that would prevent another event such as the surprise cruise ship arrival 
at Barrow. Neither is there any sign of unification with regard to roles and 
responsibilities, where their subject matter expertise converges and diverges, nor 
how they would mutually support an event occurring today. The current 
information-sharing landscape is pocketed with expertise, interest, and capability 
that require a cohesive, interconnected approach in order to leverage the 
strengths inherent in each of these partners/stakeholders.  
For this thesis, the term equity partner (partners) is defined as follows: 
organizations responsible for homeland defense and security in the Arctic region 
(e.g., DHS/USCG, DoD, Department of State (DoS), state of Alaska, local, tribal). 
Likewise, stakeholders are described as “any person, group, or organization that 
can place a claim on an organization’s (or other entity’s) attention, resources, or 
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output or that is affected by that output” (Bryson, 2004, p. 35). In other words, 
organizations with an interest in the Arctic region that could also contribute to 
and/or provide information that would support homeland defense and security 
(e.g., private sector, scientists, researchers, environmentalists, media). 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Is there an existing information-sharing strategy that allows for obtaining, 
maintaining and providing situational awareness between equity partners and the 
stakeholders interested in U.S. Arctic region?  If not, what information-sharing 
model might be implemented to support this policy most effectively? 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
For several years now, rapid climate change has affected the Arctic 
region. Numerous organizations have an interest in protecting this area and/or 
ensuring that the region can be explored, remains accessible and safely 
navigable. A cursory review of some of the likely equity partners and 
stakeholders (not all are defined in any one comprehensive list) provides insight 
into the relationship complexities that may have prohibited development of an 
information-sharing strategy thus far.  
For example, at the federal level, since the first Arctic policy, DoS has 
been engaged as the lead agency in charge of maintaining U.S. interests, 
including international relationships. While DoS is an important equity partner, it 
is only one several federal agencies with Arctic interests. As mentioned earlier, 
DoD and DHS also have specific interests in securing the Arctic. On the other 
hand, the state of Alaska’s widely publicized conflict with the federal government 
regarding drilling, sea life and other natural resources reveals its economic and 
political interests in the Arctic region. The same goes for researchers, scientists, 
and private sector organizations. 
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The disparity of organizational missions, interests and agendas has not 
been conducive to development of a naturally occurring information-sharing 
strategy. Therefore, a community of interest (CoI) needs to be built that focuses 
on the shared interests of all Arctic region equity partners and stakeholders. This 
CoI could be successful if: 1) all equity partners and stakeholders can and will 
contribute/share relevant information; 2) processes and standards will be 
developed; and 3) a collaborative system for sharing information will be agreed to 
and adopted by all. 
This CoI could leverage one of three existing information-sharing 
organizational constructs: fusion center (FC), Joint Interagency Coordination 
Group (JIACG) and Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). A review of 
three working models: Alaska Information and Analysis Center (FC AKIAC), US 
Northern Command’s (USNORTHCOM) JIACG, and the ISAC equivalent, Alaska 
Partnership for Infrastructure Protection (APIP) will be conducted. The model that 
is significantly better than the other two (based on prescribed criterion) will 
determine which construct is most suitable to support the new Arctic region 
policy. 
These three models were selected for a variety of reasons/assumptions:  
1. The FC (status quo—AKIAC) should be the model of choice based 
on standards described in national level information-sharing 
strategies.  
2. USNORTHCOM’s JIACG is a robust organization that functions at 
a national level and is also a major partner and therefore should 
have the capacity/capability/connections to support such an 
endeavor. 
3. The ISAC, emulated by APIP, provides connectivity between many 
of the local partners/stakeholders and therefore should be 
competitive in its ability to unite those organizations in order to 
protect and defend the region. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research is expected to be significant for the following reasons: 
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1. Little has been written about this topic because the latest Arctic 
region policy is quite new. Researchers attempting to understand 
how the equity partners and stakeholders might leverage one of the 
standard information-sharing models in support of a national policy 
may find the study useful. 
2. Future research efforts on behalf of other Arctic policy 
organizations will have insight into developing a practical 
information-sharing strategy. 
3. The immediate consumers for this research will be Alaskan 
Command/Joint Task Force Alaska, USNORTHCOM, state of 
Alaska, Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection, Alaska 
Information Analysis Center and local and tribal organizations. 
4. Homeland security practitioners throughout the country looking at 
alternative information-sharing models for disparate organizations, 
as well as national level policy and oversight agencies interested in 
Arctic region policy may find this research useful.   
E. METHODOLOGY 
The partners with homeland security/defense interests in the Arctic region 
are disparate organizations at all levels of government. The National Strategy for 
Information Sharing discusses creation of an Information Sharing Environment 
(ISE) to coordinate information between disparate organizations (National 
Security Council, 2007). The ISE supports a fusion center (FC) concept intended 
to be the status quo model for sharing terrorism information between all levels of 
government and the private sector (National Security Council, 2007). Therefore, 
such a model should be appropriate for Arctic policy partners.  
The policy options analysis methodology is used to compare the status 
quo (FC) and two other information-sharing models: USNORTHCOM’s JIACG 
and the Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection, which emulates the 
Information Sharing Analysis Center (ISAC) concept. This methodology will 
provide insight into which option would be most appropriate to support the 
information-sharing requirements of the partners/stakeholders supporting Arctic 
region policy.  
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This thesis reviews national and departmental level information-sharing 
strategies to establish a crosswalk between the guidance, requirements and 
execution expectations. After that, an overview of the history, concepts of 
operations, guidelines and policies/procedures for each model was conducted. 
Additional information was discovered regarding the general successes and 
challenges of implementing and sustaining these three models through reports 
from the Government Accounting Office, Office of Inspector General, 
Congressional Research Service and similar official testimony, academic studies 
and scholarly articles.  
The three criteria and scoring method shown below are used to compare 
the models against each other. The research is then analyzed to determine the 
extent to which each are met on a scale of low, medium or high, with equal 
weight applied to each criterion. Comparing the results will determine which 
model provides the most appropriate construct to facilitate information sharing for 
Arctic partners/stakeholders. 
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Table 1.   Model Criterion/Comparison 
Model Name—Score xx/27 
Level of capability to meet the prescribed criterion. 
Low/Minimal 
Score = 1 
Medium/Moderate 
Score = 2 
High  
Score = 3 
1 2 3 
Criterion 1.0  
Robustness:  
Resources, Policies, Political 
Acceptability  
Criterion 2.0  
Collaboration:  
Partners, Variety, Frequency 




Factors: Factors: Factors: 
1.1 Available resources 
(Personnel, funding, i.e., ability 
to sustain effort) 
2.1 Number of partners (few, 
some, many) 
3.1 Systems used, 
(Portals/Networks) 
Score = x 
 
Score = x 
 
Score = x 
 
1.2 Policies/Guidance 
(CONOPS, policy manuals, 
business rules, etc.) 
2.2 Levels of Collaboration 
(Federal/State/Local/Private 
Sector) 
3.2 Processes for information 
sharing/dissemination 
(templates, forms, contact lists, 
databases, etc.) 
Score = x 
 
Score = x 
 
Score = x 
 
1.3 Political acceptability 
(Level of support or opposition) 
2.3 Frequency of collaboration 
(daily, weekly, monthly) 
3.3 Standard Operating 
Procedures (e.g. instructions for 
collecting and disseminating 
information ) 
Score = x 
 
Score = x 
 
Score = x 
F. STRUCTURE 
Following this introduction, Chapter II will detail a literature review that 
researches an ongoing information-sharing strategy.  Absent such a strategy, 
Chapter III will provide an overview of the national and organizational 
information-sharing strategies, enabling an understanding of why, between the 
myriad of plans, a cohesive information-sharing strategy remains elusive.  
Chapters IV–VI will review the current models that could potentially serve Arctic 
region policy partners/stakeholders. Finally, a summary and conclusion are 
provided in Chapter VII, detailing recommendations for consideration in support 
of an information-sharing strategy for Arctic region homeland defense and 
security. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
An assumption was not made that any one organization is/would be 
responsible for an Arctic region information-sharing strategy for homeland 
security/defense. Therefore, this literature review begins with previous policies, 
defines the participating organizations, and looks for evidence of an existing 
information-sharing strategy that connects all relevant equity 
partners/stakeholders.  
A. POLICIES 
In 1971, the Nixon administration issued National Security Decision 
Memorandum 144, the first U.S. policy on the Arctic.1 This policy defined three 
major areas that the U.S. would support in the Arctic: sound and rational 
development (minimize adverse effects on the environment), international 
cooperation, and protecting security interests to include freedom of the seas and 
airspace (National Security Council, 1971). The memorandum also established 
an Interagency Arctic Policy Group (IAPG), chaired by the DoS, which included 
DoD and other appropriate agencies. This group was responsible for 
implementing, reviewing and coordinating U.S. positions on Arctic interests and 
programs, with the exception of matters internal to the state of Alaska.  
In 1983, the Reagan administration issued National Security Decision 
Directive 90 as an update to U.S. Arctic policy. This document highlighted the 
region’s growing importance due to “unique and critical interests” related to 
national defense, resources, energy development, science and environmental 
protection (National Security Council, 1983). The directive continued the focus on 
security, development, research and international cooperation. Additionally, the 
policy directed the IAPG to give priority attention to reviewing potential federal 
services that may be necessary over the next 10 years, especially those that 
                                            
1 Originally classified “SECRET,” the policy was declassified May 18, 1977. 
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impacted agencies with statutory responsibility for search and rescue, enforcing 
laws/treaties, protecting life, property and the environment. The group was also 
responsible for “close consultation” with those agencies that were involved 
domestically. 
In 1994, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive/National 
Security Council 26 (PDD/NSC 26), which, at the time, covered both Arctic and 
Antarctic Policy (National Security Council, 1994). (Apparently this document was 
originally For Official Use Only with the Arctic text included. All references to the 
Arctic have been stripped out of the current PDD/NSC 26 U.S. Antarctica policy 
that is available as open source material.)2 
In January 2009, the Bush administration released Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 25 / National Security Presidential Directive 66 (HSPD 
25/NSPD 66) Arctic Region Policy, which superseded NSC 26 with regard to 
Arctic policy. Though the words changed slightly, this most recent policy remains 
consistent with previous policies. This document specifically states that it is U.S. 
policy to “meet national security and homeland security needs relevant to the 
Arctic region” (White House, 2009). However, several other priorities also remain: 
boundary issues (treaties), scientific cooperation, maritime transportation 
(freedom of the seas), economic/energy, environmental protection and 
conservation of natural resources. In essence, the same organizations (plus 
DHS) were listed once more. 
B. ORGANIZATIONS/MISSIONS 
Four Arctic policies have been in existence since 1971. Since that time, 
several responsible organizations have connected in various ways to cooperate 
on diplomatic, social, military, economic, scientific and environmental issues. The 
latest Arctic region policy also requires a combined effort by multiple agencies in 
order to achieve the desired outcome. These organizations can be grouped using 
                                            
2 This document was not available in the National Security Archives. 
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a modified diplomatic, informational, military, economic (DIME) principle (the 
application of national power at all four levels) to determine whether any have 
developed or are considering an inclusive Arctic information-sharing strategy. 
For this review, “DIME” has been modified to “DIMES” as follows: 
 Diplomatic includes the DoS since the nature of strategic 
communication with regard to the Arctic has often been handled at 
the diplomatic level; 
 Informational mainly considers the media since this group impacts 
both the public and those organizations seeking to protect/defend 
the region; 
 Military includes both DoD and DHS since the USCG serves as an 
important partner in the Arctic area of operations and can be 
utilized in both capacities; 
 Economic includes environmental, research and private sector 
organizations, though their subject matter expertise also crosses all 
boundaries; and 
 “State” for the state of Alaska, which does not fall into the realm of 
federal agencies but has significant governmental responsibilities 
as the gateway to the Arctic for the United States. (Yalowitz et al., 
2008, p. 20) 
1. Diplomatic   
Diplomacy effectively touches upon all areas of the policy at a strategic 
level:  national security, boundary issues (treaties), scientific cooperation, 
economic/energy, environmental protection and conservation of natural 
resources. Since the first policy was issued, DoS has been engaged as the lead 
federal agency in charge of maintaining U.S. interests in Arctic Policy. The DoS 
also represents the U.S. on the Arctic Council, which is focused mainly on the 
environment and sustainable development. (The Ottawa Declaration established 
the council and, at the same time, declared that it “should not deal with matters 
related to military security” (Department of State, 2010)).  
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The Arctic Council States address legal issues such as boundaries and 
Arctic Ocean access through existing institutions. The council has created 
information-sharing projects and expects those efforts to provide data that will 
help develop policy, manage communities and inform decision making. Likewise, 
the council supports the “Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks,” which is “a 
process to support and strengthen the development of multinational engagement 
for sustained and coordinated pan-Arctic observing and data sharing systems 
that serve societal needs, particularly related to environmental, social, economic 
and cultural issues.” (Arctic Observing, 2009)  The intent of this program is to 
coordinate a larger network of data sharing; however, security issues are not 
included in the mission statement. 
Though the DoS has instigated these collaborative partnerships, there is 
no open source evidence that a specific information-sharing capability for Arctic 
HD or HLS has been constructed or is tied into any of its existing programs. The 
reason for this may be that DoS needs to be viewed as “neutral” with regard to 
defense/military activities in order to maintain its diplomatic status. 
2. Informational 
As alluded to in the introduction, the impact of the media in educating, 
sensationalizing, persuading, promoting or developing opinions by way of sharing 
information about the Arctic is without question. However, there is no reason to 
expect that those included in this group would be leading any type of organized 
strategy for information-sharing with regard to Arctic security. In this case, the 
researcher views the media as filling a supporting (or potentially adversarial) role 
for those responsible for these activities. 
3. Military  
The latest Arctic policy has generated renewed interest, even though the 
first U.S. nuclear powered submarine surfaced at the North Pole in the 1950s, 
long before the 1971 policy was issued. As primarily a maritime domain, the 
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Arctic has been of interest mainly to the U.S. Navy (USN) and USCG. Many 
documents have been written about both organizations’ respective missions and 
ability to function in the harsh environment. However, at the government level, 
little has been published regarding information-sharing with regard to security 
interests, even though there have been multiple symposia and reports that have 
dealt with the implications of maritime operations in an ice-free Arctic.  
For example, in 2001, the Office of Naval Research and the Arctic 
Research Commission held a symposium on Naval Operations in an Ice-free 
Arctic. The document provided naval policy changes that would be required to 
better support Arctic operations in 2015–2020; these did not include a homeland 
security/defense information-sharing strategy (Office of Naval Research, 2001). 
In 2007, the “Impact of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime 
Operations” report was issued by the National Ice Center and Arctic Research 
Commission.3 Again, HLS/HD information-sharing was not addressed (National 
Ice Center, 2007). Finally, in 2009, a third symposium was held. The Center for 
Naval Analyses provided a briefing on climate change, national security and the 
impact on naval operations. It also did not mention a strategy for sharing such 
information (Bowes, 2009). 
Similarly, the 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support does 
not mention the Arctic, though it does describe the need to have: 
…maximum awareness of threats in the approaches as well as the 
air and maritime interception capabilities necessary to maintain US 
freedom of action, secure the rights and obligations of the United 
States, and protect the nation at a safe distance. (DoD, 2005, p. 12)  
As well, the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) 
acknowledges the Arctic Ocean, but that is the only mention of the word in the  
 
 
                                            
3 National Ice Center is a multi-agency operational center operated by the U.S. Navy, the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S. Coast Guard. 
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entire document (DoD & DHS, 2005). A supporting plan to the NSMS, National 
Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, also written in 2005, does not 
even mention the word “Arctic” (DoD & DHS, 2005). 
In the Draft 2008 U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Plan, one of the focus 
areas is on enhanced homeland security and defense of the Arctic. The 
document admits that “continued dialogue with the U.S. Navy, USNORTHCOM, 
Special Operations Command, the intelligence community, and a wide range of 
federal, state, local, and tribal agencies will be critical...” (USCG, 2008, p. 12). 
Additionally, “a better understanding of what is occurring on, above, and below 
the water is a challenge that must be overcome to acquire the actionable 
intelligence required to successfully prosecute our missions” (USCG, 2008, p. 
14). Aside from these instances, the plan generally acknowledges the need to 
share intelligence and information, but does not describe a process or program 
devoted to doing so.4 
At the local level, it is well known that the USCG has already begun 
testing capabilities, identifying challenges, surveying sea ice and monitoring 
vessel traffic in U.S. Arctic waters. RADM Gene Brooks, former Commander of 
Alaska District 17 operations stated:  
Many of the significant threats come from traditional Coast Guard 
maritime safety and security vectors. Whether the issue is 
commercial vessel safety, marine environmental protection, living 
marine resources, or homeland security, the Coast Guard must 
step forward to protect this emerging domain. (Brooks, 2010)   
Neither his speech, nor the USCG brief “The Emerging Arctic: A New 
Maritime Frontier” mention the need for coordinated information-sharing (USCG, 
2010). It is known that the USCG is still studying its role, requirements, and gaps 
in the Arctic; the results from a “High Latitude Study” are not due until the 
summer of 2010. 
 
                                            
4 A final version of this document could not be located. 
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Further review led to several other military authorities that might have 
interest in developing an Arctic information strategy. USNORTHCOM is 
responsible for planning, organizing and executing DoD’s HD and civil support 
missions in Alaska. USNORTHCOM shares the maritime HD responsibility in this 
area with the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). Though PACOM’s longitudinal 
boundary is close to Alaska and the command owns maritime assets, none are 
currently resident to support the Arctic region. USNORTHCOM also has a 
subordinate, Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK) that has the responsibility for HD 
missions within the joint operating area, which currently ends at the shoreline.  
U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC, Norfolk, VA) is the designated Joint 
Forces Maritime Component Commander-North for USNORTHCOM and 
conducts maritime HD throughout the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. 
NORTHCOM assigned a formal coordination line between USFFC and JTF-AK. 
However, the remote location of Alaska and inherent distance from major USN 
fleet concentration areas make it difficult for USFFC assets to rapidly respond to 
maritime HD concerns. Based on this current force positioning, local assets from 
USCG District 17 will likely be called upon as first responders in the Arctic for 
both HD and HLS missions. To codify this relationship, a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) between the JTF-AK Commander and the USCG District 
17 Commander was signed on June 23, 2009. The MOU emphasizes 
coordination to “successfully blend DoD's responsibilities with those of DHS 
through planning, training, exercises and operations conducted by JTF-Alaska 
and District 17 officials ”…and provides “heightened emphasis on alignment of 
the two organizations in support of a unified approach to the security and 
defense of Alaska” (USAF, 2009). The document does not describe information-
sharing responsibilities. 
In a March 2009 speech, the USNORTHCOM Commander also 
acknowledged impending Arctic tasks: “In the future, pursuit of natural resources 
and the potential increase in traffic of northern waterways will demand increased 
air and maritime surveillance, security, and defense in the Arctic Region”  
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(Renuart, 2009). He also discussed an evaluation of northern surveillance 
systems and the ability to monitor the Arctic approaches but did not mention an 
effort to build an information-sharing strategy. The commander’s testimony and 
the MOU suggest that JTF-AK (under USNORTHCOM) and USCG D17 would be 
the most likely organizations developing a homeland security/defense 
information-sharing strategy. Literature relating to such a strategy was not 
discovered during this review.  
4. Economic/Environmental 
A great deal of the literature dedicated to climate change and its affect on 
the Arctic has focused on private sector economic and environmental issues. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the oil industry has a vested interest in the Arctic. 
In fact, the state of Alaska's two largest taxpayers are BP and ConocoPhillips 
(Conoco Phillips, 2006). (The two companies stated that in 2006, the oil industry 
generated about 34,000 jobs and around $4.4 billion in Alaska payroll, roughly 20 
percent of the private sector (Conoco Phillips, 2006)).  The oil industry spends 
more than two billion dollars per year on goods and services within the state, 
roughly equal to the state’s general fund budget spending (Conoco Phillips, 
2006).  The significance of this lens on the Arctic and subsequent volume of 
writing that is dedicated to these economic concerns is readily apparent.  
Similarly, the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report provides 
insight into the spotlight on environmental issues:  
…more than 185 experts participated directly in the work of the 
AMSA. Thirteen major AMSA workshops were held from July 2006 
through October 2008 on a broad range of relevant topics, including 
scenarios of future Arctic navigation, indigenous marine use, Arctic 
marine incidents, environmental impacts, marine infrastructure, 
Arctic marine technology and the future of the Northern Sea Route 
and adjacent seas. (Arctic Council, 2009, p. 3) 
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Other stakeholders agree that the environment and management of 
natural resources are the most pressing security issues in the North (Yalowitz et 
al., 2008, p. 22). From an information-sharing standpoint, there are over 40 
research programs, institutions, and educational organizations (including a 
University of the Arctic) conferring at the policy and operational level (NOAA, 
2010). Many of these organizations have been monitoring and reporting on the 
various environmental aspects of the Arctic for decades, some with security 
interests.  
One example, the Institute of the North (founded in 1994), is a:  
…center for the study of commonly owned lands, seas and 
resources using the ‘owner state’ of Alaska as a model. Its mission 
combines both economic relevance and geopolitical urgency as 
most trouble spots around the world are found in regions where the 
commons has been mismanaged or exploited. (Institute of the 
North, 2010) 
Within this organization is the Security and Defense Program, which 
“conducts research and educates policymakers on strategic issues relating to the 
defense of the United States that particularly concern decision makers in Alaska 
and at the state and local level throughout the nation” (Institute of the North, 
2010). The program publishes a newsletter entitled “Vanguard,” which provides 
synopsis information of various topics including missile defense, homeland 
security, cyber security and wire releases on current events (Institute of the 
North, 2010). Similarly, there is an Alaskan sub-cabinet that cooperates on 
issues involving interested stakeholders such as the University of Alaska, 
scientists, non-governmental organizations, the state of Alaska, federal 
government authorities and indigenous group leaders (Yalowitz et al., 2008, p. 
23).  
The volume of information generated by this sector has been focused 
historically, on economic, scientific, environmental and educational areas. While 
these organizations are certainly contributors of information that would support 
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Arctic homeland defense and security, they do not appear to have developed a 
homeland security/defense information-sharing strategy.   
5. State of Alaska 
The state of Alaska is the U.S. gateway to the Arctic region. The Division 
of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHS&EM) was created by 
Alaska Statute 26.20.025 (Alaska Legal Resource Center, 2010). Subsequently, 
Administrative Order No. 203, issued January 13, 2003, placed the state DHS 
within the Department of Military and Veterans Affairs (DMVA) to “maximize the 
security of the citizens of Alaska” (State of Alaska, 2004). The state DHS is the: 
…single, statewide focal point for coordinating the State's efforts to 
prevent terrorist attacks, reduce Alaska's vulnerability to terrorism, 
and minimize the loss of life or damage to critical infrastructure, and 
recover from attacks if they occur. (State of Alaska, 2010) 
One of the duties of DH&EM is to coordinate federal, state, local, and 
private agencies' homeland security activities. They also coordinate the state 
homeland security strategy/plan with the state emergency plan and with the 
homeland security and disaster plans of the federal government. In addition, the 
organization provides other planning, prevention, preparedness, response and 
mitigation measures designed to eliminate or reduce the threat or effect of an 
attack.  
The 2009 Alaska State Homeland Security Strategy (AKHSS) recognizes 
the importance of reducing vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, major disasters and 
emergencies. It acknowledges that this will require coordination, cooperation and 
a focused effort throughout federal (military and civilian) and state agencies, local 
jurisdictions, tribal, private and non–profit organizations (State of Alaska, 2009, p. 
1). Homeland security grant dollars for DHS&EM in fiscal year 2009 totaled six 
point five million dollars (DHS, 2010). These funds were allocated to provide for 
critical tasks at the state level that include crisis management, intelligence  
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gathering/notification and critical infrastructure analysis (Office of Management 
and Budget, 2010). A further review of the 2008 and 2009 AKHSS revealed three 
goals relative to information sharing: 
Table 2.   Comparison of 2008 and 2009 AKSHSS Information-sharing Goals 
2008 AKSHSS 2009 AKSHSS 
Goal 2: “strengthen information and intelligence 
sharing”  
Goal 4 is identical (State of Alaska, 
2009, p. 15) 
Goal 2—Objective 2A: “develop a network and 
procedures among local, tribal, State and 
Federal agencies, and private sector 
organizations for the dissemination of critical, 
time-sensitive intelligence among participants.” 
(State of Alaska, 2008, p. 11) 
Goal 4—Objective 4A is identical 
(State of Alaska, 2009, p. 15) 
 Goal 2—Objective 2A—Step 2: “analyze the 
integration of existing interagency information-
sharing processes into a statewide fusion 
center.” (State of Alaska, 2008, p. 11) 
Goal 4—Objective 4A—Step 2: 
“analyze the integration of existing 
interagency information-sharing 
processes into a virtual statewide 
fusion center. (State of Alaska, 
2009, p. 15) 
 Goal 2—Objective 2A—Step 3: “develop a 
concept plan for HSIN State portal and 
implement recommendations.” (State of Alaska, 
2008, p. 11) 
 
Goal 4—Objective 4A—Step 
3:“continue to expand the use of the 
HSIN State portal to include 
expansion to the Homeland Security 
Data Network...” (State of Alaska, 
2009, p. 15) 
 
The verbiage in these documents indicates that an information-sharing 
strategy is not yet firmly in place. Given the fact that neither the 2008 nor 2009 
strategies mention the word “Arctic,” it can reasonably be assumed that a specific 
strategy for information-sharing focused on that topic also does not exist.5 (The 
capabilities and status of the fusion center will be covered further in Chapter IV.) 
One final note: in August 20, 2009 the governor of Alaska gave a policy 
speech on the strategic importance of the Arctic before the U.S. Senate 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security Appropriations (Parnell, 2009). He 
acknowledged the importance of national and homeland security with respect to 
                                            
5 The 2008 and 2009 AKHSS documents are nearly identical in verbiage with regard to 
vision, mission and goals. 
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protecting the Arctic, but his message did not include the words “information  
sharing” (Parnell, 2009). He mentioned the development of a “National Arctic 
Doctrine” that includes all stakeholders, but did not elaborate on what this effort 
entailed (Parnell, 2009). 
C. CONCLUSION 
A variety of Arctic policies have been in existence since 1971. Since that 
time, several responsible organizations have connected in various ways to 
cooperate on diplomatic, social, military, economic, scientific and environmental 
concerns. These organizations were grouped using a modified “DIMES” 
approach to determine whether any had developed or were considering an Arctic 
information-sharing strategy focused on homeland security/defense. This 
literature review indicates that while there are many agencies involved in 
supporting Arctic Policy, and some have developed a considerable willingness 
and capability to share information, so far, there is no publicly advertised system 
that is collecting and sharing homeland security/defense information between all 
Arctic policy partners/stakeholders.  
A 2009 draft report submitted to the state of Alaska confirms this 
conclusion from a research perspective:  
There is no single agency, organization, or collaborative 
association within Alaska that is tasked with systematically 
coordinating the identification, collection, compilation, analysis, and 
publishing of climate change data and research. This important task 
is required to ensure the quality necessary to effectively support 
decision-making and evaluate and manage multifaceted risks and 
threats such as those associated with climate change in Alaska. 
(State of Alaska, 2009, p. 5) 
The next chapter will inform the reader as to why the three information-
sharing models have been selected for review. 
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III OVERVIEW—INFORMATION-SHARING STRATEGIES 
This chapter provides a snapshot of six information-sharing strategies that 
affect the majority of the responsible Arctic region partners (homeland security, 
intelligence, law enforcement and defense). The overarching National Strategy 
for Information Sharing is reviewed first in order to lay the foundation for the 
status quo/option one (fusion center) and policy option two (information sharing 
analysis center). The next four strategies, DHS, Intelligence Community (IC), 
Department of Justice (DoJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provide 
background information and highlight interagency linkages and common ties 
between the organizations. The DoD Information Sharing Strategy is also 
covered as a lead-in to the third policy option, the Joint Interagency Coordination 
Group model. Finally, a description and highlights of the “Information Sharing 
Environment,” the entity intended to provide a shared information space, 
common standards, best practices and accountability for the entire community 
supporting terrorism information sharing, is also provided.  
The intent of this overview chapter is threefold: 1) communicate the basic 
principles of each document, 2) relate the extent to which the documents 
converge on an existing implementable construct for Arctic policy partners, and 
3) provide insight into why the status quo and two option model constructs were 
selected for review. Instead of citing the applicability of each strategy to the Arctic 
policy partners, a general recap of the strategies is provided at the end of the 
chapter. 
A. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING (NSIS)  
The overarching guidance for sharing information between the public and 
private sectors comes from the 2007 NSIS, which describes both a strategic 
vision and guiding principles in one document. This strategy acknowledges that 
homeland security and law enforcement information related to terrorism “can 
come from multiple sources at all levels of government as well as the private 
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sector organizations and foreign sources” (National Security Council, 2007, p. 1). 
It further describes that such information is needed to support efforts to prevent 
terrorist attacks, develop critical infrastructure protection and resilience plans, 
and prioritize emergency management response and recovery planning activities 
(National Security Council, 2007, p. 1). 
The NSIS takes its lead from the 2006 National Security Strategy and is 
aligned with other strategies such as Homeland Security and Combating 
Terrorism (National Security Council, 2007, p. 5). The document cites the 2004 
Executive Order (EO) 13354 that created the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC), a clearinghouse for terrorism intelligence and information sharing 
between DOJ, DHS and other appropriate agencies. All federal agencies are 
slated to provide information to the NCTC, which is the “Federal fusion center” 
that analyses and integrates all terrorism related intelligence (National Security 
Council, 2007, p. 15). Inside the NCTC is the Interagency Threat Assessment 
Coordination Group (ITACG), which in turn disseminates terrorism related 
information products to state, local, tribal and private sector partners. ITACG is 
intended to be the link between the Intelligence Community, DHS, FBI  state and 
local representatives until the ISE is mature (National Security Council, 2007, p. 
18). 
The NSIS frequently refers to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). IRTPA created the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE), to “enable trusted partnerships among all levels of 
government, private sector and foreign partners in order to more effectively 
detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt and mitigate the effects of terrorism in the 
United States” (National Security Council, 2007, p. 10). The ISE is designed to 
break down existing stovepipes and extend common standards to state, local 
and tribal governments and the private sector, enabling full partnership 
participation. This entity will be covered more thoroughly in a subsequent section. 
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1. Fusion Centers  
The NSIS describes support for establishing a network of state and major 
area fusion centers. The document acknowledges that fusion centers “will serve 
as the primary focal points within the State and local environment for the receipt 
and sharing of terrorism-related information” (National Security Council, 2007, p. 
20). Fusion centers are, therefore, intended to be the conduit for information 
sharing to and from the federal government; they may also further customize the 
information received from federal agencies for their own use. Guidelines and 
baseline capabilities for fusion centers were developed through the Global 
Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council.   
The intent is for fusion centers to become interconnected with the federal 
government and each other.  The NSIS acknowledges that “the Federal 
government will support the establishment of these centers and help sustain 
them through grant funding, technical assistance, and training...” (National 
Security Council, 2007, p. 20). The goal is to have federal government personnel 
imbedded within fusion centers where possible. At the same time, the federal 
government expects that “locally generated information that is not threat or 
incident related is also to be gathered, processed, analyzed and interpreted by 
those same fusion centers in coordination with locally based Federal officials and 
then further disseminated to the national level...” (National Security Council, 
2007, p. 20). This could be interpreted as an “all-hazards” approach, requiring 
fusion centers to provide more than just law enforcement/terrorism information 
collection and dissemination. This is an important point for Arctic policy partners 
since gaining situational awareness in the region would require a variety (all 




Due to the mandate described above, the Alaska Information Analysis 
Center (the “fusion center” for the state of Alaska and Arctic partner) will be 
reviewed in Chapter IV as the “status quo” option.  (The name for the Alaska 
fusion center should not be confused with the Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center construct covered in the following paragraph.) 
2. Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) 
The NSIS acknowledges that 85 percent of the infrastructure and 
resources critical to the nation is in the hands of the private sector, which has 
made significant investments with regard to interagency information sharing 
(National Security Council, 2007, p. 4). (Much of this effort stemmed from the 
1998 Presidential Decision Directive/National Security Council-63 Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, which called for the creation of ISACs. Multiple ISAC 
organizations have since expanded across the various infrastructure sectors.)   
The NSIS recognizes that industry plays a significant role in building an 
effective two-way information flow between public and private sectors, and it 
expects that information from critical infrastructure and key resource owners will 
be incorporated into the integrated network of state and major urban area fusion 
centers. The strategy also emphasizes that the ISE is slated to expand these 
original information-sharing mechanisms by adding secure networks that will 
encourage more collaboration between the public and private sectors (National 
Security Council, 2007, p. 10). 
The NSIS also recognizes that many private sector organizations currently 
leverage both ISACs and fusion centers. For this reason, the researcher chose to 
review the Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection (Chapter VI), which 
emulates the ISAC construct. Many of the Arctic policy partners are already 
members of this organization; they connect daily on issues related to homeland 
security as well as all-hazards within the state of Alaska. 
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In summary, the NSIS does not dictate a single national model for 
information sharing that Arctic stakeholders’ can readily apply. It simply lays out a 
foundation, including several organizations intended to promote/facilitate 
information sharing with the federal government.  
B. DHS—INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY (DHS ISS) 
This 2008 document refers to the expectation of the President and 
Congress for DHS to “play a central role in augmenting the Nation’s ability to 
gather, analyze and disseminate information and intelligence” (DHS, 2008, p. 2). 
The strategy states that the IRTPA and other regulatory documents ensure that 
DHS would have an essential part in the ISE. It describes a close relationship 
with the Program Manager (PM) ISE in order to “coordinate the development of a 
common National framework for information sharing” (DHS, 2008, p. 3). The 
strategy recognizes that “clearly defined institutionalized rules, roles and 
responsibilities are necessary to ensure effective information sharing” (DHS, 
2008, p. 6). The objectives stipulated in the strategy include: the need for 
integrating fusion centers, coordinating with the ISE, recognizing the needs of 
other organizations and integrating those needs as part of the DHS ISE, and 
ensuring that DHS technology platforms facilitate information sharing with 
partners.  
The DHS ISS cites the need to coordinate trusted information-sharing 
policies within the ISE framework based on known community needs, while 
exchanging information with non-federal partners using an inclusive, networked 
fusion center construct. The document specifically states, “information needs and 
missions of all stakeholders, not technology, will drive the design of the DHS 
information sharing environment. Technology will be used to enhance and 
simplify information sharing” (DHS, 2008, p. 7). In other words, tools will be used 
in support of protocols that facilitate interoperability, allowing cross-functional 
information sharing between communities of interest.  
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C. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY—INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY 
(IC ISS) 
This document was also issued in 2008 and likewise states that the 
President and Congress mandated a more integrated enterprise for routine 
intelligence community information sharing. It cites many of the same authorities: 
IRTPA, EO’s, and the 9-11 Commission, as catalysts for developing the strategy. 
The IC ISS recognizes the progress that has been made due to the standup of 
the NCTC, ISE, and related partnership efforts. However, “these endeavors, 
though proving to be excellent in facilitating greater information sharing, are the 
‘tip of the iceberg’ and continued focus on ‘accelerated information sharing’ is 
needed” (U.S. Intelligence Community [IC], 2008, p. 3). There is mention that 
information sharing is a behavior not technology, and such behavior means: 
“exchanging intelligence information between collectors, analysts and end users 
in order to improve national and homeland security” (IC, 2008, p. 3). The new 
information-sharing model is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.   USIC ISS Information Sharing Model (From IC ISS, p. 9) 
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The IC ISS also references the changing threat environment for national 
and homeland security customers and how these emerging threats require 
intelligence from various sources. It acknowledges that the old business model 
does not satisfy modern requirements: “...in today's environment the traditional 
lines between foreign and domestic, and strategic and tactical intelligence 
operations, and customer and producer are blurring, creating an imperative to 
improve integration between National and Departmental intelligence programs” 
(IC, 2008, p. 7). This will be accomplished via an integrated intelligence 
enterprise.  
The new IC ISS information-sharing model discusses a “responsibility to 
provide” where the “end-state is a common trust and information environment, 
wherein all intelligence information is discoverable and mission 
accessible...Ultimately, the new information-sharing model will foster greater 
collaboration among intelligence community stakeholders and partners” (IC, 
2008, p. 9). The IC ISS also promotes five keystones: these include: maximizing 
the availability of information retrieval and dissemination; discoverability and 
accessibility; trust and understanding of missions; a culture that rewards 
information sharing; and a single information environment that will enable 
improved information sharing (IC, 2008, p. 10).  
The goals supporting these keystones are similar to the other strategies: 
uniform information sharing, policy and governance; universal information 
discovery and retrieval; a common trust environment and enhancing 
collaboration across the community. The goals are fleshed out with actions that 
develop policies, processes, procedures, standards and tools including virtual 
collaboration, identity management and information security policies using a risk 
management approach to protect sources and methods. The implementation 
strategy for these efforts consists of five building blocks: governance, policy, 
technology, culture and economics (IC, 2008, p. 17). These keystones, goals, 
and building blocks are very comparable with the strategies discussed earlier.  
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There are also references to aligning with other information-sharing efforts 
such as the NSIS, which the document concludes “will improve interagency at 
the Federal level, while building information sharing bridges between the Federal 
Government and our non-Federal partners” (IC, 2008, p. 17). The IC ISS notes 
that leveraging the ISE and DHS ISS will “ensure alignment to the overarching 
community-wide goals and objectives for information sharing” (IC, 2008, p. 17). 
The document made no direct reference to fusion centers, labeled the ISE as the 
solution for information-sharing requirements, and touted the NCTC as 
integrating “all intelligence possessed or acquired by the U.S. government 
pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism and for ensuring that agencies have 
access to and receive intelligence needed to accomplish their activities” (IC, 
2008, p. 17). In essence, this strategy focuses inwardly on how the IC will comply 
with the NSIS and provided consensus with regard to the ISE as the place to 
share.  
D. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (DOJ) LAW ENFORCEMENT 
INFORMATION SHARING PROGRAM (LEISP) 
While somewhat dated, this 2005 document remains DOJ’s transformation 
document on how it will share law enforcement information with all partners. The 
vision is to “create relationships and methods that allow information to be shared 
routinely across jurisdictional boundaries to prevent terrorism...” (U.S. 
Department of Justice [DoJ], 2005, p. iii).The intent is to achieve this vision by 
“formulating information sharing policies and standard business practices and by 
creating a unified, Department-wide technology architecture that will position 
DOJ as a committed partner in the information sharing environment of federal, 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies” (DoJ, 2005, p. iii). This strategy 
guides all DoJ information sharing with the ISE and “contributes to the fulfillment 
of the ISE by providing a single point of contact for DoJ information and by 
providing a foundation for information sharing among law enforcement at the 
federal, state, local, and tribal levels” (DoJ, 2005, p. 6). The document also 
addresses the “move from a culture of ‘need to know’ towards a culture of ‘need 
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to share’ in which information is shared as a matter standing operating 
procedure” (DoJ, 2005, p. iii). The LEISP describes three tracks that expect to 
provide a “single face” with partners: leveraging existing technology, building new 
platforms, and enhancing national level interconnectivity. These are similar goals 
to those expressed in previously covered strategies (DoJ, 2005, p. iii). 
LEISP also provides: 
…uniform DOJ policies and processes for sharing its 
information....a foundation for broadening the reach of the ISE to 
the thousands of state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners, 
where the process of transforming data to information and finally to 
intelligence is most critical. (DoJ, 2005, p. 6) 
This document makes it clear that law enforcement information is more 
than the IRTPA focus on terrorism information sharing. The strategy is focused 
on collecting all law enforcement information and creating a “one DOJ” approach 
to sharing. Nearly the same vintage as the NSIS, the LEISP points to the ISE as 
the connective entity and mentions the ongoing development and eventual 
connection to the fusion centers.  
E. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) NATIONAL 
INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY (FBI NISS) 
The 2008 NISS was selected for review due to its currency and the FBI's 
key role in terrorism information sharing for Arctic policy partners. This strategy 
falls under the umbrella of the LEISP; both indicate a strong connection to the 
ISE. The NISS provides a now familiar vision, goals and framework for 
information sharing with partners at all levels of government, the private sector 
and foreign partners. It also “addresses the cultural and technological changes 
required to move the FBI to a ‘responsibility to provide culture’” (FBI, 2008). 
Similar to the preceding strategies, this policy distinguishes the framing 
documents (IRTPA, EO’s, LEISP, ICISS, NSIS and ISE) as mandates and 
guidance. The NISS has two primary objectives: creating a culture of information 
sharing and developing and maintaining an information technology platform that 
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will support relevant activities. The document highlights five categories of 
information-sharing customers: 1) presidential offices, 2) DoJ and other federal 
agencies, 3) state, local, tribal, 4) private sector and 5) foreign partners (FBI, 
2008). 
The NISS references a myriad of “information sharing entities” that the FBI 
will interface with at the national level, for example: NCTC, Terrorist Screening 
Center, Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, National Gang Intelligence 
Center and National Crime Information Center (FBI, 2008). The document relates 
that the NSIS mandated the use of the ISE for information sharing with state, 
local, and tribal entities, and that those efforts include: state and major urban 
area fusion centers, e-Guardian and the ITACG (FBI, 2008). At the private sector 
level, the FBI will interface with InfraGard, Cyber Initiative Resource Fusion Unit 
and the Domestic Security Alliance Council (FBI, 2008). 
In summary, the DHS, IC, DoJ and FBI strategies indicate commonalities 
in the way they support the NSIS, alluding to the variety of organizations that also 
process homeland security information. The connection between these strategies 
and the ISE will be covered later in this chapter. 
F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY 
(DOD ISS) 
The 2007 DoD ISS was prepared by the Information Sharing Executive, 
Office of the Chief Information Officer. The document defines information sharing 
as “making information available to participants (people, processes, systems)” 
and “cultural, managerial and technical behaviors by which one participant 
leverages information held or created by another partner” (Department of 
Defense [DoD], 2007, p. 16). The document acknowledges the NSIS, EO 13388 
and IRTPA, promoting that “the strategy and efforts must be synchronized in 
order to achieve the unity of effort as well as economic and operational 
efficiency” (DoD, 2007, p. iii). The strategy promotes a common vision to 
synchronize initiatives to share information among DoD components, 
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international coalition partners, and the private sector.6 The vision acknowledges 
that individual or limited approaches will not ensure success among the agencies 
and that trust and agreed upon rules must be dominant factors. The DoD ISS 
looks to achieve its goals by promoting a “federated information sharing 
community and environment to maintain trust, promote collaboration, leverage 
information integrators in the community and reduce the seams between 
organizations”7 (DoD, 2007, p. 10). 
The strategy confirms that DoD intends to continue working inside the 
“evolving Federal approach” and acknowledges that external agencies may have 
different operating environments that should not preclude successful information 
sharing (DoD, 2007, p. 2). Likewise, it stresses that:  
…the Department must have the ability to transfer information to 
and obtain information from external partners, overcoming 
situations where these partners may have disparate processes and 
capabilities and whose role and nature may not be known prior to 
an event. (DoD, 2007, p. 4) 
It also acknowledges that DoD has to adjust to “a major cultural shift 
...from information ownership to information stewardship” (DoD, 2007, p. 10). The 
document highlights five touchstones of successful information sharing: culture, 
policy, governance, economic, and resources in technology and infrastructure as 
shown in Figure 8. The strategy recognizes that “effective information sharing 
enables DoD to achieve dynamic situational awareness and enhance decision-
making to promote unity of effort across the department and with external 
partners” (DoD, 2007, p. 2). 
                                            
6 Partner: an entity that takes part in an information sharing activity with DoD (DoD, 2007, p. 
16). 
7 Collaboration: pattern of interaction where two or more parties are working together toward 




Figure 8.   Information Sharing Implementation Touchstones 
 (From DoD, 2007, p. 10) 
The DoD ISS argues that synchronizing across information-sharing 
initiatives “will give the DoD flexibility to share information with planned and 
unanticipated partners across planned and unanticipated events” (DoD, 2007, p. 
15). At the same time, “the department will seek opportunities to reach out to 
partner organizations that may benefit from this information sharing initiative” 
(DoD, 2007, p. 15).  
In February 2009, DoD issued Directive 8000.01 on Management of the 
Department of Defense Information Enterprise. This document “provides 
direction for information sharing among all DOD components and mission 
partners, consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing” (DoD, 
2009, p. 1). The policy is: 
...that information shall be considered a strategic asset to the 




and made available throughout the information life cycle to any 
DoD user or mission partner to the maximum extent allowed by law 
and DoD policy.” (DoD, 2009, p. 2)  
The glossary states that the DoD information enterprise shares 
“information across the Department of Defense and with mission partners” (DoD, 
2009, p. 16). 
The Directive was followed shortly thereafter by the April 2009 Information 
Sharing Implementation Plan, issued by the DoD Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration / Chief Information 
Officer. Under focus Area 10, Supporting DoD’s Mission Needs Across Federal 
Information Sharing Initiatives, during fiscal year 2010–2014 several tasks and 
responsibilities are highlighted. These include: “appropriate” support for 
development of the “Federal ISE” and “determine the level of DoD engagement 
and support” for the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group, state 
and major urban area fusion centers and developing “DoD’s portion of the 
Federal ISE Shared Space” (DoD, 2009, p. 26).  These statements indicate that 
DoD is still determining the level of engagement and support for both the ISE and 
fusion centers. 
This researcher believes that the intent of the DoD ISS, Directive 8000.01 
and Information Sharing Implementation Plan is to share information with other 
organizations in accordance with the NSIS, while allowing DoD the autonomy to 
develop its own information enterprise and subordinate coordination groups 
responsible for interagency information sharing. Accordingly, Chapter VI provides 
a review of USNORTHCOM’s JIACG, the likely organization that would be 
responsible for homeland defense information sharing with Arctic policy partners.  
G. INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT (ISE) 
While the NSIS provides the overarching guidance stipulating information 
sharing, the ISE is intended to be the framework for connecting participants. This 
means coordination among all levels, sharing intelligence products and enabling 
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State, local and tribal government to gather, process, analyze and share 
information (National Security Council, 2007, p. 11). In other words, the ISE 
could be thought of as the Web intended to facilitate linkage between all 
participants of the information-sharing communities, which includes Arctic policy 
partners. Figure 9 diagrams the intended interaction. It is important to review the 
status of this entity in order to understand the role it plays with regard to an 
existing, usable information-sharing construct.  
 
Figure 9.   The ISE (From McNamara, 2009, p. 3) 
As mentioned in the NSIS, Section 1016 of the 2004 IRTPA called for the 
ISE and defined it as an approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism 
information (National Security Council, 2007, p. 12). Recall that the NSIS 
referenced the 2004 EO 13356, which established an Information Systems 
Council and dictated that agency heads would create common standards and 
share/disseminate information to the greatest extent allowable by law. 
EO 13356 was superseded by EO 13388 in October 2005, including the 
new Director of National Intelligence and a name change from Information 
Systems to Information Sharing Council (ISC). (These EOs were designed to 
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ensure the proper coordination of federal departments and agencies participating 
in the ISE.) The ISC is chaired by the Program Manager (PM) and includes many 
of the Arctic partners: Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and 
Directors of National Intelligence, CIA, FBI and NCTC (National Security Council, 
2007, p. 12).   
The PM and ISC are required to “develop policies, procedures, guidelines, 
and standards, and proper coordination among Federal departments and 
agencies participating in the ISE” (National Security Council, 2007, p. 12). The 
Implementation Plan was designed to build:  
…a trusted partnership among all levels of government in the 
United States, the private sector, and our foreign partners, in order 
to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of 
terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the United 
States by the effective and efficient sharing of terrorism and 
homeland security information. (National Security Council, 2007, p. 
10)  
The intent of the ISE is to: create a culture of sharing, reduce barriers to 
sharing, improve sharing practices with all partners (federal, state, local, tribal 
and foreign), and institutionalize sharing8 (National Security Council, 2007, p. 
10). 
The 2005 Preliminary Report on the Creation of the Information Sharing 
Environment (due six months after enactment of the IRTPA) described initial 
technical, legal and policy issues brought forward by the ISC via the Program 
Manager—Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). Three of the five issues 
presented concerned ambiguous and conflicting authorities and policies 
governing agency roles and responsibilities, lack of organizational trust, and the 
ability to collaborate timely due to limited access to information (Russack, 2005, 
p. 4). The following year, the new PM-ISE stated:   
                                            
8 “The term ‘information sharing’ in the ISE context means that the proper information, 
properly controlled, gets to the right people in time to counter terrorist threats to our people and 
institutions” (Paul, 2010, p. 1). 
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I believe that right now the main problem is not too little information 
flow from the five federal community members to State and Local 
elements, but too much flow of uncoordinated information to State 
and Local levels...In contrast there is little information flow from 
local and tribal levels the state and federal level. (McNamara, 2006, 
p. 4)  
During this same time, the PM highlighted success stories, including the 
NCTC, Terror Screening Center, fusion centers, DHS's Web portals, DOJ's 
LEISP and DoD’s Global Information Grid, which was developed in concert with 
the ODNI IC Enterprise Architecture “to support all DoD, National Security, and 
related IC mission and functions in war and peace” (McNamara, 2006, p. 7). It 
should be noted that when mentioning fusion centers he added:  
There is, however, no national strategy that defines federal 
collaboration with these centers. Each State and Local fusion 
center has developed its own way of interfacing with various federal 
agencies entities involved in terrorism prevention and response 
efforts. Additionally, fusion centers rely on multiple channels to 
exchange terrorism information with the various Federal entities 
involved in investigatory, prevention, response, and recovery 
activities. It is one of my highest priorities to greatly improve this 
situation. (McNamara, 2006, p. 10) 
The PM’s statement also provided guiding principles for the ISE effort at 
that time, which included: common standards and best practices, information 
access via a shared information space, security and privacy safeguards, risk 
management for information disclosure, trust built through auditing, performance 
evaluation, accountability and transparency (McNamara, 2006, p. 14).  
Another of these principles was the deployment of a “decentralized, 
distributed and coordinated model so that the handling of terrorism information in 
the ISE will take place directly among users, using a Web-enabled, network 
model accessible to each of the stakeholders in information sharing” (McNamara, 
2006, p. 13). This has apparently evolved into the current approach within the 
2008 ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework which intends to: “leverage existing 
information sharing policies, business processes, technologies, systems, and 
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promote a culture of information sharing through increased collaboration” 
(McNamara, 2008, p. 11.) Figure 10 highlights the framework as described. 
 
Figure 10.   ISE Framework (From Enterprise Architecture Framework Version 
2.0, 2008 p.12) 
The ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework also provides that:  
...while participants in the ISE are still responsible for their own 
counterterrorism missions and systems supporting these missions, 
the physical ISE, as a functioning system-of-systems, will improve 
the overall effectiveness of individual counterterrorism business 
processes and capabilities through increased access to terrorism 
information across the ISE community. (McNamara, 2008, p. x) 
Fast forward three years to the Third Annual Report to the Congress on 
the ISE Progress and Plans in 2009. The original four goals are restated: culture 
of sharing, reduce barriers, improve sharing practices with federal, state, local, 
tribal and foreign partners and institutionalize sharing (McNamara, 2009, p. vii).  
A new framework is presented that “creates critical linkages between the four 
primary and enduring ISE goals, fourteen sub-goals, and a resulting set of 




measures” (McNamara, 2009, p. 32). Aligned to the framework is the new ISE 




Figure 11.   ISE Maturity Model Concept (From Enterprise Architecture 
Framework Version 2.0, 2008, p.33) 
The document asserts, “building on existing systems and capability, the 
ISE is a system of policies, business practices, architectures, standards, and 
systems that enable routine, controlled information sharing among all ISE 
participants” (McNamara, 2009, p. 2). The report also claims that the “ISE has 
become the most developed information sharing environment in government, the 
central focal point for terrorism-related information sharing at all government 
levels, and a model for replication of information sharing elsewhere in the 
government” (McNamara, 2009, p. 2). 
That said, in the months before the 2009 report was released, the 
following statements were documented by high level practitioners/partners in the 
terrorism information-sharing community: 
From a former U.S. Attorney:  
In my view, the [information sharing] initiatives have cost a lot of 
money, put lots of people to work, put new technologies into the 
public service, and given agency officials political cover with the  
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illusion of progress, but have not produced meaningful information 
sharing and have had virtually no operational impact. (McKay, 
2008, p. 3) 
The CEO of the National Native American Law Enforcement Association 
stated:   
There may be too many Federal Intelligence and Information 
Sharing groups within the Federal Government that appear to 
duplicate or replicate Intelligence dissemination. Many Tribal 
departments do not have the staff to participate in multiple groups 
and compare and analyze which one best serves their need for a 
particular vulnerability or threat.” (Edwards, 2009, p. 4) 
And similarly, the Director of the Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center 
commented that “...we don’t yet have a single place to go for information...I have, 
by the way, nearly 30 passwords to change every quarter...what should take 30 
seconds takes 30 minutes...” (Porter, 2008, p. 12). 
The Government Accounting Office came to a similar conclusion: “Our 
review showed that the performance measures used to assess the ISE’s 
progress focus on counting activities accomplished rather than results achieved 
and are not presented in a way that explains how they represent progress toward 
attaining strategic goals” (GAO, 2008, p. 8). In general, these examples reveal a 
disconnect between the user community and the policy makers regarding the 
success of the ISE over the past five years. Perhaps one of the best descriptions 
of the complexity of the ISE goals is provided by the DoD Information Sharing 
Implementation Plan: 
The ISE Shared Space enables uniformity in the information 
exchange of terrorism-related information. It is built in accordance 
with the ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework and is the IT 
infrastructure for information sharing. The ISE Shared Space 
enables each ISE participant to make terrorism-related information, 
applications, and services accessible to ISE users in each of the 
three security domains (TS/SCI, Secret/Collateral, and SBU/CUI). 
More specifically, the Shared Space is where the ISE elements are 
standardized through the implementation of common terrorism 
information sharing standards. Physically, the Shared Space is a 
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set of hardware and software on a protected/secure network that is 
exposed at the boundary of an ISE participant’s internal network—
intranet. Alternatively, it may be hosted by a third party (e.g., 
another ISE participant), while remaining under the participant’s 
funding, management, and control. (DoD, 2009, p. 31) 
H. CONCLUSION 
The strategies reviewed in this chapter provide overarching principles for 
sharing information between federal, state, local and private sector/mission 
partners. Table 3 recaps the major focus areas for each strategy. 
Table 3.   Comparing the Strategies: Major Focus Areas / Key Words 
Document Major Focus Areas / Key Words 
NSIS Governance: IRTPA/EO’s, ISE/ISC, NCTC, ITACG, Fusion Centers, 
ISACs 
DOD ISS Culture, Policy, Governance, Economic and Resources, 
Technology/Infrastructure, Mission Partners  
DHS ISS Fusion Center Integration, ISE Coordination, Recognize/Integrate 
External Organizational Needs Into DHS ISE, Ensure DHS 
Technology Platforms Facilitate Information Sharing With Partners 
USIC ISS Governance, Policy, Technology, Culture and Economics, 
Information Discoverability, Retrieval, Accessibility, Trust, 
Collaboration, “Single Information Environment”  
DoJ LEISP Single Point of Contact for Law Enforcement Sharing, Uniform 
Policies, Procedures, Foundation for Reaching Partners through the 
ISE 
FBI NISS Move to a Responsibility to Provide, Create Culture of Sharing, 
Effective Information Technology Platforms, Work with Information 
Sharing Entities, ISE focus 
There is agreement among the strategies that breaking down cultural 
barriers, improving sharing practices and collaboration, developing policies and 
procedures, as well as institutionalizing sharing as a way of doing business are 
all valid goals. The NSIS specifically states that the ISE is the place for all this to 
occur across the five communities: intelligence, law enforcement, defense, 
homeland security and foreign affairs (National Strategy for Information Sharing, 
2007, p. 15). Likewise, the various strategies acknowledge the NSIS 
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requirements, yet at the same time, the respective organizations have 
maintained a degree of autonomy by keeping their working models (fusion 
center, ISAC and JIACG) functioning. This may be because the ISE is a strategic 
“work in progress” that has had mixed results, leaving agencies to continue using 
existing models that support their missions. This approach would ensure 
continuity of effort until an effective ISE is functioning as advertised.  
As shown Figure 12, all three of the policy model options under 
examination are in the “current” container. (Each entity predates the information-
sharing strategies reviewed.)  
 
Figure 12.   Information Sharing Strategy and Outcome 
Likewise, the graphic indicates that there is some level of homeland 
security/defense information flow overlap since each provides connectivity 
between federal, state and local communities of interest. The bottom line is that 
the current way of “doing business” does not point to one optimal solution for 
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information sharing (intended to be the ISE). With that in mind, a review of each 
of the three policy model options will attempt to determine which would be best 
suited to support Arctic policy partners.  
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IV. STATUS QUO—FUSION CENTER CONSTRUCT 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of two core documents: 1) 
Fusion Center Guidelines, which provides background information on fusion 
centers to include a definition and foundational guidelines, and 2) Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, which details 
subsequent target capabilities. The intent is to provide a context for the model 
construct under review using the existing federal government strategy for building 
and maintaining fusion centers. The core documents summary is followed by a 
review of the existing fusion center in Alaska (status quo model):  “Alaska 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center.” The goal is to inform the reader of the 
viability of this model as an existing information-sharing construct for Arctic 
region partners. 
A. FUSION CENTER GUIDELINES 
Published in August 2006, this document provided the following definition 
for a fusion center: “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide 
resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing 
their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist 
activity” (DHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 2).  
The guidelines document also explains the makeup of a fusion center:  
The primary components of a fusion center are situational 
awareness and warnings that are supported by law enforcement 
intelligence, derived from the application of the intelligence process, 
where requirements for actionable information are generated and 
information is collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and 
disseminated. Other key components resident in the fusion center 
include representatives of public safety, homeland security, the 
private sector, and critical infrastructure communities. Important 
intelligence that may forewarn of a future attack may be derived 
from information collected by local, state, tribal, and federal law 
enforcement agencies; public safety agencies; and private sector  
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entities through crime control and other normal activities, as well as 
by people living and working in our communities. (DHS & DOJ, 
2006, p. 12) 
Figure 13 diagrams the components participating in the fusion center 
construct. 
 
Figure 13.   Fusion Center Components (From DHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 13) 
The document also states, “These guidelines should be used to ensure 
that fusion centers are established and operated consistently, resulting in 
enhanced coordination efforts, strengthened partnerships, and improved crime-
fighting and antiterrorism capabilities (DHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 2). The text 
acknowledges that a wide variety of organizations contribute to a successful 
fusion center. For example, “public safety and private sector components are 
integral in the fusion process because they provide fusion centers with crime 
related information, including risk and threat assessments, and subject matter 
experts who can feed and threat identification” (DHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 2). 
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Similarly, the “nontraditional collectors of intelligence, such as public 
safety entities and private sector organizations, possess important information 
that can be ‘fused’ with law enforcement data to provide meaningful information 
and intelligence about threats and criminal activity” (DHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 3). 
This approach is especially important, given the wide variety of organizations that 
make up the Arctic region partners. Finally, “ideally, the fusion center involves 
every level and discipline of government, private sector entities, and the public, 
though the level of involvement that some of these participants will vary based on 
the circumstances” (DHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 3). Shown in Figure 14 and as 
described by the Homeland Security Council, the act of “fusing” is: 
…the overarching process of managing the flow of information and 
intelligence across levels and sectors of government and the 
private sector to support the rapid identification of emerging 
terrorism-related threats and other circumstances requiring 
intervention by government and private-sector authorities. (DHS, 
Homeland Security Advisory Council, 2005, p. 3) 
 
Figure 14.   Fusion Process (From DHS & DOJ, 2006, p. 11) 
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In general then, the intent is for fusion centers to gather, process and 
disseminate intelligence and information horizontally to stakeholders as well as 
vertically to the federal level. Before these guidelines were produced, many 
fusion centers had been operating according to their mission sets. Captured in 
Table 4 are the set of standards (18 guidelines) for establishing and operating 
fusion centers. The intent of providing these in their entirety is to inform the 
reader of how comprehensive they are, keeping in mind that these will also 
“guide” the Alaska fusion center organizers.  




1 Adhere to the tenets contained in the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing 
Plan and other sector-specific information-sharing plans, and perform all 
steps of the intelligence and fusion processes. 
2 Collaboratively develop and embrace a mission statement, and identify 
goals for the fusion center. 
3 Create a representative governance structure that includes law 
enforcement, public safety, and the private sector. 
4 Create a collaborative environment for the sharing of intelligence and 
information among local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement 
agencies, public safety agencies, and the private sector. 
5 Utilize Memoranda of Understanding, Non-Disclosure Agreements, or other 
types of agency agreements, as appropriate. 
6 Leverage the databases, systems, and networks available via participating 
entities to maximize information sharing. 
7 Create an environment in which participants seamlessly communicate by 
leveraging existing systems and those currently under development, and 
allow for future connectivity to other local, state, tribal, and federal systems. 
Use the U.S. Department of Justice’s Global Justice Extensible Markup 
Language Data Model and the National Information Exchange Model 
standards for future database and network development, and consider 
utilizing the Justice Information Exchange Model for enterprise 
development. 
8 Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties policy. 
9 Ensure appropriate security measures are in place for facility, data, and 
personnel. 
10 Integrate technology, systems, and people. 
11 Achieve a diversified representation of personnel based on the needs and 





12 Ensure personnel are properly trained. 
 
13 Provide a multi-tiered awareness and educational program to implement 
intelligence-led policing and the development and sharing of information. 
14 Offer a variety of intelligence services and products to customers. 
15 Develop, publish, and adhere to a policies and procedures manual. 
16 Define expectations, measure performance, and determine effectiveness. 
17 Establish and maintain the center based on funding availability and 
sustainability. 
18 Develop and implement a communications plan among fusion center 
personnel; all law enforcement, public safety, and private sector agencies 
and entities involved; and the general public. 
1. Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers (Capabilities) 
The guidelines were supplemented by the Capabilities document in 
September 2008. This document also refers to the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing goal of establishing a national integrated network of state 
and major urban area fusion centers and how these capabilities ultimately “assist 
in ensuring that fusion centers have the basic foundational elements for 
integrating into the national Information Sharing Environment (DHS & DOJ, 2008, 
p. 2). (Recall the current functioning status of the ISE from Chapter III.) The 
document then walks through each of the 18 original guidelines and provides 
capabilities that, once completed, will place the fusion center in alignment with 
the guidelines.  
On more than one occasion, the document states that the fusion centers 
may rely on each other to provide specific capabilities, since one of the fusion 
center guidelines founding principles is to “leverage existing resources and 
expertise where possible” (DHS & DOJ, 2008, p. 2).This document, as well as 
the NSIS, respects that a “fusion center’s mission should be defined based on 
local needs” and that there is an option to be “all-crimes” or “all-hazards,” 
stipulating that an “all hazards approach is not a baseline capability” (DHS & 
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DOJ, 2008, p. 7). These statements point to the overarching intent that there is 
no “one size fits all;” in other words, there is a high degree of flexibility in 
developing a fusion center. 
The capabilities document is divided into two sections as described below.  
a. Section 1  
Describes the tasks that need to be completed in order to support 
the fusion process. To a large degree, these functions mirror the intelligence 
cycle steps: planning and direction, collection, processing/collation, analysis, 
dissemination, reevaluation” (DHS & DOJ, 2008, p. 9).These tasks are 
summarized in the table below: 
Table 5.   Summarized Fusion Center Process Task Descriptions 
Area Task Descriptions 
Planning/Direction Coordinate with other fusion centers; Conduct/contribute to 
risk assessments; Define information requirements; Develop 
suspicious activity reporting; Disseminate alert 
warnings/notifications to State, Local and Tribal authorities, 
private sector and general public; Situational awareness 
reporting; Data source definition (what is necessary to 
conduct analysis); Coordinate with response and recovery 
officials; Coordinate information sharing with private sector 
and critical infrastructure and key resources; Participate in 
exercises 
Gathering/Collection Information gathering reporting strategy; Implement a 
feedback mechanism; Collect and store information 
Processing/Collation Information collation; Validate/assure reliability and relevancy 
of information  
Analysis/Production Analytical products (what will be provided and how the 
product will be disseminated); Training plan; Information 
linking; 
Analysis services for the jurisdiction; Open-source analysis 
capability; Analyst specialization skills and analytical tools. 
Dissemination Dissemination plan; Reporting to other centers and Federal 
partners.  
Reevaluation Develop and implement a performance evaluation plan. 
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b. Section 2  
Focuses on managing a fusion center, with functional areas that 
include: management/governance, information privacy protections, security, 
personnel and training, information technology, and funding as summarized in 
Table 6 (DHS & DOJ, 2008, p. 9). 
Table 6.   Summarized Fusion Center Management Task Descriptions 
Area Task Description 
Management/Governance Mission statement; Collaborative environment for 
stakeholders; Policies and procedure manual; 
Performance measurements; Outreach to leaders and 
policymakers, public, private, media, and citizens.  
Information Privacy/ 
Protection /  
Privacy official; Policy; Protection; Outreach; 
Accountability  
Security  Security Measures; Policy; Procedures; Security Officer, 
Information security 
Personnel/Training Staffing plan; Background checks; Training Plan 
Information Technology, 
Equipment, Systems 
Facility, and Physical 
Structure 
Business Processes; Information Exchange; 
Communications Plan; Contingency and Continuity of 
Operations Plans 
Funding Investment Strategy to achieve and sustain capabilities  
In summary, these documents provide the guidelines and 
capabilities for the operation of fusion centers, including the Alaska Information 
Analysis Center.  
B. ALASKA FUSION CENTER—ALASKA INFORMATION ANALYSIS 
CENTER (AKIAC) 
Prior to reviewing the current status of the AKIAC (“Center”), it is prudent 
to understand the genesis and chronology of the organization and how it fits 
within the larger state homeland security picture.  
As stated in the literature review, the mission statement of the state of 
Alaska, Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (DHS&EM) 
provides that the organization is the “single, statewide focal point for coordinating 
the State's efforts to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce Alaska's vulnerability to 
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terrorism, and minimize the loss of life or damage to critical infrastructure, and 
recover from attacks if they occur” (State of Alaska, 2010). 
DHS&EM coordinates the state’s homeland security strategy/plan with the 
State Emergency Response Plan and with the homeland security and disaster 
plans of the federal government. This is in line with the guidelines document, 
which states, “the fusion process should be organized and coordinated on a state 
level, and each state should establish and maintain an analytic center” (DHS & 
DOJ, 2006, p. 14). In support of the state’s mission, one goal of the 2006/2007 
Alaska State Homeland Security Strategy (AKSHSS) was to strengthen 
information and intelligence sharing (State of Alaska, 2006, p. 8). One of the 
steps to accomplish this goal was to “analyze the integration of existing 
interagency information sharing processes into a statewide fusion center” (State 
of Alaska, 2006, p. 8). 
In October of 2007, the status of the AKIAC was described in a 
Government Accounting Office report to Congress (based on interviews with the 
directors of each fusion center), which read:   
The Alaska Fusion Center is in the advanced planning stage with 
the major concentration being on defining the missions, developing 
the governance, and outlining potential products and services. The 
fusion center will be a combined effort of the Alaska Department of 
Public Safety and the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Management. While they do not have a physical fusion 
center, planning officials have partnerships established with the 
FBI, other federal and state law enforcement, the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, the U.S. Coast Guard, the military, and the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Through these 
partnerships, the member agencies already share information and 
coordinate activities. The officials said that they are considering the 
advantages of a joint, permanently staffed facility. If feasible and 
advantageous, they will plan to build or move into an available 
facility in the future.  
The Alaska Fusion Center will have an all-crimes, all-hazards, and 
all-source scope of operations. As a result of Public Safety and 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management involvement in 
developing the fusion center, the center will have both law 
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enforcement and emergency management components. All-source 
includes law enforcement as well as economic information and 
infrastructure issues. The center will have three focus areas: day-
to-day compilation, distillation, and distribution of information 
products; analyses and assessments of patterns and trends in the 
risks, threats, and hazards facing Alaska; and serving as an 
operational planning group serving all agencies when a threat 
emerges or a disaster occurs. The center has access to DHS’s 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Department of 
Justice’s Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the Department of 
Defense’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). 
(GAO, 2007, p. 53–54) 
The 2006/07 strategy and GAO report predate a November 28, 2007 letter 
from the DHS Secretary Chertoff and the DoJ Attorney General Mukasey sent to 
the governor of Alaska. The letter describes the ISE, IRTPA, NSIS and the 
establishment of an integrated network of fusion centers as previously mentioned 
in Chapter III (Chertoff & Mukasey, 2007). The letter also referenced Guideline 2 
above and proffered that DOJ and DHS will work with governors to designate 
fusion centers and coordinate information sharing using an all crimes approach 
(Chertoff & Mukasey, 2007). The letter requested that if there is no state 
organization that it is currently functioning in this capacity, that the state reach 
out to the National Fusion Center Coordination Group for support using the 
contact information provided (Chertoff & Mukasey, 2007). Apparently, DHS/DOJ 
were unaware of the GAO report and status of the developing center as noted 
above. 
The following year, the 2008 AKSHSS contained the identical verbiage for 
strengthen information and intelligence sharing: “analyze the integration of 
existing interagency information sharing processes into a statewide fusion 
center” (State of Alaska, 2008, p. 11). The 2009 strategy added the word “virtual” 
in front of “statewide fusion center,” otherwise the text was unchanged from the 
previous two iterations” (State of Alaska, 2009, p. 15). 
The strategies themselves do not indicate that progress has been made to 
date regarding the development of a “fusion center.” However, in September of 
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2009, the new Alaska governor responded to the 2007 letter from the Attorney 
General and Secretary of DHS. The letter acknowledges the recent 
establishment of the AKIAC, located in the FBI field office in Anchorage, Alaska. 
The governor’s letter also stated that the AKIAC is “responsible for coordinating 
the gathering, processing, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism and law 
enforcement information in Alaska and will serve as the state's designated 
primary ‘fusion center’ in the Information Sharing Environment” (Parnell, 2009). 
That same year, the governor described the functionality of AKIAC in a 
press release:  
The Department of Military and Veterans Affairs [DHS&EM is 
nested within this organization] collaborated with the Department of 
Public Safety to establish a Fusion Center and Alaska Information 
Analysis Center for information sharing and analysis and to become 
part of the national Information Sharing Environment. This resulted 
in faster and more efficient response to threats to Alaska and 
infrastructure (Parnell, 2009). 
Also in 2009, the National Fusion Center Coordination Group labeled the 
Alaska Statewide Law Enforcement Information Center in Anchorage as one of 
50 “Primary Designated Fusion Centers.” This means that the center is: 
 Designated by the Governor as the primary state center 
 Responsible for passing relevant homeland security information 
received from the federal government to other centers in the state 
as well as to nonparticipating law enforcement agencies 
 Agrees to follow the Fusion Center Guidelines and work toward 
attaining the Baseline Capabilities for fusion centers 
 Managed and run by the state, or the state’s designee, in which the 
center is located 
 Receives some level of federal support (grant monies, deployment 
of federal personnel, IT systems, and/or security clearances) 
 Comprises two or more state or local agencies. (National Fusion 
Center Coordination Group, 2009) 
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As of 2010, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and policy manual for 
the AKIAC are still in draft form. However, these draft documents do provide 
insight into the existing capabilities and direction the center is headed. The 
current vision and mission statements are:  
Vision: “to provide a centralized, comprehensive, multiagency, 
information sharing network to enhance their strategic and 
operational effectiveness of all Alaska public safety agencies 
involved and crime prevention, crime investigation, counterterrorism 
and homeland security.” (Alaska Information Analysis Center 
[AKIAC], 2009a, p. 1) 
Mission: “to evaluate, analyze, and disseminate information 
regarding criminal, terrorist and homeland security activity in the 
state of Alaska while complying with state and federal law to ensure 
the rights of privacy at all. (AKIAC, 2009a, p. 1) 
The CONOPS provides that “the AKIAC is established to provide a central 
clearinghouse for information sharing focusing on homeland security, organize 
criminal activity and all hazards within and surrounding the state of Alaska” 
(AKIAC, 2009a, p. 1). The organization will accomplish this mission by producing 
and disseminating: bulletins and assessments; investigation and analysis support 
of suspicious activity reports; responding to requests for information and requests 
for service for members and customers; collaboration with federal state and local 
agencies to produce joint products; coordinating/facilitating regional training 
opportunities; identifying patterns and trends; and assisting in the coordination 
and the deconfliction of information between members and customers.  
The goals and objectives of the center are to facilitate information sharing 
among all levels of government and the private sector. These include defining 
collection requirements, providing a central dissemination point, supporting 
significant incident responses, and establishing the organization as the primary 
contact for law enforcement and homeland security information sharing in the 
state (AKIAC, 2009a, p. 2).The intent is to increase the decision-making 
capabilities of state and local leadership by collecting, managing, and distributing 
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strategic and tactical information and developing and implementing useful and 
meaningful products, processes and tools for information analysis. Additionally, 
the organization will develop a plan to sustain operations, an outreach/liaison 
program, and operating policies to include privacy, funding, training and 
evaluation.  
Governance for the AKIAC is an executive committee that includes the 
three major stakeholders: AST, AK DHS&EM, and FBI. These members 
determine the policies and procedures, with overall guidance and support of the 
organization being the responsibility of Alaska Department of Public Safety 
(DPS), which oversees the AST. The AKIAC is currently staffed with a 
representative from each participating agency at their own expense. The 
members work with DHS and other state and federal agencies to create 
statewide threat assessments, which are then used to create collection 
requirements based on the risks identified. Bi-directional information flows from 
regional law enforcement investigative groups, statewide task forces, 
participating agency representatives, liaison officers and other fusion centers. 
The organization reviews this information to identify threats and trends, and 
produces information bulletins that are then disseminated to registered members.  
The center also provides training regarding collection requirements to 
customers of the center, which include law enforcement, first responders, 
government and private-sector personnel (AKIAC, 2009a, p. 3). The organization 
is pursuing development of “a statewide information liaison officer program 
designed to expand membership and information” (AKIAC, 2009a, p. 6). While 
the current funding situation relies on each participating agency to provide 
support to the organization out of existing budgets, the center expects to identify 
additional sustainable funding options via the grant application process (AKIAC, 
2009a, p. 6). 
As mentioned earlier, the policy manual for the center is also currently 
under development. The draft document identifies the functions and 
responsibilities for participants assigned to or working within the organization. 
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The policy states that the center’s viewpoint is statewide, with a particular focus 
on critical infrastructure, weapons of mass destruction and homeland security 
(AKIAC, 2009b, p. 1).The staff is expected to respond to any valid requirements 
for products or services based on approved priorities and manpower (AKIAC, 
2009b, p. 3). The Center operates during the weekday from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 
p.m. During these hours, members receive, as well as disseminate, various 
electronic documents, presentations and other intelligence related products via a 
DPS networked computer server. The manual discusses the option to have 
members link into their organizational networks in addition to utilizing the DPS 
local area network. This allows for multiple options to share information as well 
as connect to various Web-based databases.  
The procedures for handling information are situationally dependent. 
Members receive information through various queries to include other law 
enforcement organizations and directly from the public. Responses may be made 
in person or by telephone, electronic mail, fax, letter or a detailed intelligence 
product, and all within compliance of applicable regulations (AKIAC, 2009b, p. 3). 
Information that leads to intelligence is stored in the statewide law enforcement 
intelligence database. The policy acknowledges the value of collected 
information and ensures dissemination to personnel, teams or agencies for 
“analysis, training and other purposes (AKIAC, 2009b, p.4). 
In order to fully balance the assessment of whether or not this model could 
support Arctic policy partners (given that this is the status quo/nationally 
recognized construct for homeland security information sharing), the researcher 
investigated the center’s past funding shortfalls. A cursory review of the fusion 
center grant awards (investment justification submitted by the state of Alaska) 
over the past several years provided additional insight into this limitation.  
For example, in 2006, $557,000 in Homeland Security Grant Funding was 
allocated to the Alaska Information Coordination Center (AICC) then aka “fusion 
center (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2008, p. 57). The 
2007 investment justification shows that AICC was part of a $1.5 million funding 
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distribution (FEMA, 2009, p. 5). The 2008 investment justification (#8) is labeled 
“Strengthen Information Sharing and Collaboration Capabilities” with a 
corresponding statement that “Alaska does not operate a ‘brick-and-mortar’ 
fusion center, and this investment will support our continued efforts to collaborate 
and share information and intelligence in a virtual setting where possible (FEMA, 
2009, p. 58). 
The baseline description in this document also claims:  
The State Emergency Coordination Center [part of DHS&M] 
continues to produce, refine, and disseminate intelligence and 
information on all-hazards events. Daily, weekly, and event-driven 
situation reporting is in place. The Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 
of Alaska (ATACA) and their Joint Coordination Group and 
Intelligence Advisory Group continue to provide coordinated law 
enforcement and counter-terrorism related information and 
intelligence. The member organizations of the ATACA continue to 
work directly with the Joint Terrorism Task Force, the Department 
of Defense, and the State of Alaska. Critical Infrastructure/Key 
Resource owners, operators, and government agencies continue to 
share information and intelligence through organizations like the 
Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection and InfraGard. 
(FEMA, 2009, p. 57) 
The link between the above organizations/partnerships and the AKIAC is 
unclear. (Recall that in 2009 the governor stated that the AKIAC is “responsible 
for coordinating the gathering, processing, analysis, and dissemination of 
terrorism and law enforcement information in Alaska... serve[ing] as the state's 
designated primary ‘fusion center’ in the Information Sharing Environment 
(Parnell, 2009). 
Finally, the 2009 state investment strategy only mentions “fusion center” 
with regard to the 2006 grant funding (FEMA, 2009, p. 5). Investment #1 is 
“Strengthen Planning and Preparedness (FEMA, 2009, p. 5). The purpose 
statement provides that: 
This Investment integrates four previous investments, reflecting 
inherent linkages and shared strategies among planning and 
preparedness, regional collaboration, and information sharing. 
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Regional and statewide planning workshops, training, and 
exercises foster regional collaboration, information sharing, and the 
ability to respond and communicate effectively with partners within 
and across communities...Information and intelligence sharing will 
further develop as partner agencies continue statewide planning. 
(FEMA, 2009, p. 5) 
The step towards “integration of existing interagency information sharing 
processes into a virtual statewide fusion center” as part of Goal 4, Strengthen 
Information and Intelligence Sharing, in the 2009 AKSHSS is not referenced as 
part of the investment justification (State of Alaska, 2009, p. 15). Whether “brick 
and mortar” or “virtual,” the most recent funding investments appear to exclude 
the AKIAC (documented fusion center) in favor of a variety of previously 
established information-sharing organizations.  
This spending approach seems counter to the intent of previous grant 
funding, and disagrees with the fiscal year 2010 DHS grant guidance. In this 
document, DHS highlights the purpose of the State Homeland Security Program 
(SHSP) to provide “funds to build capabilities at the state and local levels and to 
implement the goals and objectives included in state homeland security 
strategies [emphasis added] and initiatives in their State Preparedness Report” 
(DHS, 2010, p. 3). 
Likewise, DHS prescribes that funding is specific for fusion centers: 
...consistent with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 
Act of 2007 (Public Law 110-53) (9/11 Act), states are required to 
ensure that at least 25 percent of SHSP appropriated funds are 
dedicated towards law enforcement terrorism prevention-oriented 
planning, organization, training, exercise and equipment activities, 
including those activities which support the development and 
operation of fusion centers [emphasis added]. (DHS, 2010, p. 3) 
As stated in the Introduction, the policy options analysis methodology 




in the matrix below. Table 7 provides a numbered score: low (1), medium (2) and 
high (3), to indicate the level to which AKIAC complies with the prescribed 
criterion.  
Table 7.   AKIAC Capability Analysis 
AKIAC (Fusion Center Model) Score 19/27 
Level of capability to meet the prescribed criterion. 
Low/Minimal 
Score = 1 
Medium/Moderate 
Score = 2 
High  
Score = 3 
1 2 3 












Factors: Factors: Factors: 
1.1 Available resources 
(Personnel, funding, i.e., 
ability to sustain effort) 
2.1 Number of partners 
(few, some, many) 
3.1 Systems used, 
(Portals/Networks) 
Score = 1 
No dedicated funding; 
participating organizations 
support with existing 
budgets; small staff 
Score = 2 
Some partners (mainly law 
enforcement) 
Score = 3 
Access to multiple 
collaborative systems; 
sharing information at 
multiple levels 
1.2 Policies/Guidance 
(CONOPS, policy manuals, 
business rules, etc.) 
2.2 Level of collaboration 
(federal/state/local) 
3.2 Processes for 
information 
sharing/dissemination 
(templates, forms, contact 
lists, databases, etc.) 
Score = 2 
In draft form; being worked 
Score = 3 
Collaborating at all levels 
Score = 2 
Some working processes 
still being defined; (drafts) 
1.3 Political Acceptability 
(Level of support or 
opposition) 
2.3 Frequency of 
collaboration (daily, weekly, 
monthly) 
3.3 Standard Operating 
Procedures (e.g. 
instructions for collecting 
and disseminating 
information ) 
Score = 1 
Focused primarily on law 
enforcement 
Score = 3 
Daily collaboration 
Score = 2 
Some working procedures 
still being defined; (drafts) 
The analysis indicates a score of 19/27, reflecting that the AKIAC has an 
overall moderate level of capability to meet the prescribed criterion. This model’s 
score was lowered by the lack of robust funding/resources, corresponding 
policies, processes and procedures that remain in draft form, limited partners and 
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political acceptability based on current law enforcement focus. The organization 
has created a mission statement, is working on policy, procedures and training, 
sharing intelligence and information, leveraging available databases, systems, 
and networks, offering services and products to customers and determining the 
effectiveness of these efforts. In summary, the center appears to be following the 
fusion center guidelines and capabilities to the extent possible given the limited 
staff. Without the capability to “establish and maintain the center based on 
funding availability and sustainability,” it may be difficult for the organization to 
act as a viable model that could support Arctic region partners (DHS & DOJ, 
2006, p. 63). 
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V. JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP (JIACG) 
MODEL 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM) JIACG model was selected for review for two main reasons: 1) 
the command shares the homeland defense mission within the Arctic region (as 
shown in Figure 15), and 2) the organization’s established information-sharing 
relationships with many of the other relevant equity partners at the national level.  
 
Figure 15.   USNORTHCOM's Arctic Area of Responsibility (From DoD, 2010) 
Before reviewing USNORTHCOM’s structure, a short background on the 
history of the JIACG concept is in order. According to the DoD Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, a JIACG is:  
An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and 
collaborative working relationships between civilian and military 
operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and 
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military experts accredited to the combatant commander and 
tailored to meet the requirements of a supported joint force 
commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the 
joint force commander with the capability to coordinate with other 
US Government civilian agencies and departments. (DoD, 2009, p. 
290) 
The JIACG concept was conceived after experimentation by U.S. Joint 
Forces Command (JFCOM), Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Innovation and 
Experimentation Directorate in early 2001. The groups were designed to improve 
planning and coordination between DoD staffs and civilian agencies of the U.S. 
government (USG), which initially were focused mainly on the international “war 
on terrorism” and humanitarian support overseas (U.S. Joint Forces Command 
[JFCOM], 2007, p. vi). JFCOM claims that the “JIACG provides the critical 
linkage between the military and engaged U.S. government agencies that allow 
the coordinated application of all instruments of national power (JFCOM, 2007, p. 
II-1).  JFCOM’s intent was to test the idea of “placing a civilian oriented 
interagency element on combatant commander staffs (JFCOM, 2010). The group 
was expected to coordinate at the headquarters staff level daily, providing 
continuous advice/interagency subject matter expertise on civilian agency 
operations, capabilities and limitations. Among other functions, the JIACG would 
also provide the perspective of civilian agencies to all military operational 
planning activities and exercises. This would allow the military to better 
understand how civilian agencies approach a situation in which they would likely 
end up working together.  
In October 2001, the Secretary of Defense directed that all combatant 
commanders were authorized to develop JIACGs and “liaise directly with the 
appropriate agencies to explore needed capabilities and relationships to support 
theater counterterrorist operations” (Bogdanos, 2007, p. 4). This guidance 
allowed for flexibility among the combatant commanders in how they employed 
their JIACGs. Implementation was based on the mission focus of each 
combatant command, so naturally the first JIACG’s had different structures and 
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members. For example, U.S. Pacific Command’s JIACG focused almost 
exclusively outwardly on counterterrorism in their area of responsibility (Marks, 
2005, p. 8). 
By the time USNORTHCOM stood up in October 2002, the JIACG was an 
accepted governmental entity. With USNORTHCOM’s new mission, “anticipates 
and conducts Homeland Defense and Civil Support operations within the 
assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States 
and its interests,” the organization had a natural reason to embrace the JIACG 
concept (USNORTHCOM, 2010). Figure 16 highlights the civil support missions 
that would require interagency coordination. 
 
Figure 16.   NORAD/USNORTHCOM Missions (From Catalino, 2009, p. 5)  
Indeed, the command developed an entirely separate directorate for 
Interagency Coordination (IC), under which its JIACG falls. According to a recent 
Interagency Coordination briefing, the USNORTHCOM IC provides an 
operational level interagency context for the commander (USNORTHCOM 
Interagency Coordination [USNC IC] Division Chiefs, 2010, p. 3). Their mission is 
to “facilitate the integration and synchronization of interagency activities to 
ensure mutual understanding, unity of effort (Catalino, 2009, p. 3). The IC is 
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divided into four divisions: operations, planning and synchronization and 
capabilities and outreach. Under these divisions are: training and exercise, 
preparedness and planning, law enforcement/ security, concepts and technology 
and private sector integration as shown in Figure 17.  
 
Figure 17.   NORAD/USNORTHCOM Missions (From Catalino, 2009, p. 10) 
While early JIACGs may have generally fallen in line with one of three 
communities: intelligence, political-military or law enforcement, USNORTHCOM’s 
focus is on “mission partners,” which includes all three disciplines as well as the 
private sector (Bogdanos, 2007, p. 6). To exchange knowledge and information, 
the IC hosts conferences and seminars, as well as bi-monthly JIACG forums with 
agency participants and other staff. According to the draft JIACG Strategy, 
USNORTHCOM interprets the term “JIACG” to mean the “collective ‘body’ of the 
staff and non-DoD agency representatives...” (USNC IC, 2009, p. 6). Many of  
these agency representatives are resident at USNORTHCOM; others exist in 
different directorates or are within the local area and provide support when 
needed.  
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This type of coordination and synchronization between organizations is 
intended to provide the Command the ability to reach out to 60+ agencies at all 
times (19 are resident on a daily basis; the rest can be tapped during surge 
operations) (USNC IC, 2009, p. x). In 2005, then USNORTHCOM Commander 
Admiral (ADM) Keating testified that his JIACG “includes 59 resident DoD and 
non-DoD agency representatives, all of whom provide subject matter expertise to 
ensure mutual support of homeland defense and civil support missions.” As of 
August 2009, USNORTHCOM’s JIACG continued to coordinate with over 60 
mission partners, some of which are shown in Figure 18 (Catalino, 2009, p. 5).  
 
Figure 18.   USNORTHCOM's Mission Partners (McConnell, n.d., p. 4)  
This multi-layered approach is expected to support the development of 
habitual relationships. Similarly, the JIACG has endeavored to focus outside the 
“DOD centric mindset to consider the interagency perspective,” believing that “it 
is imperative that USNORTHCOM coordinate, collaborate, integrate, and 
synchronize with agency partners either in response or in planning” (USNC IC, 
2009, p. 5). Therefore, on a day-to-day basis, the JIACG plans to support routine 
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operational planning and initiatives and manage the flow of information and 
knowledge regarding civilian organizations relative to military operational 
planning (USNC IC, 2009, p. 6). This “all of government/whole of society” 
approach is being used to facilitate the support of homeland defense and civil 
support operations such as the recent earthquake in Haiti as well as the most 
recent oil spill response effort in support of the recent sunken offshore drilling rig 
Deepwater Horizon.  
In a proactive sense, the JIACG has worked with state organizations to 
facilitate assessments regarding vulnerabilities such as typhoons, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanoes (USNC IC, 2009, p. 18). This data allows 
the group to conduct gap analyses to get an idea of state vulnerabilities and any 
likely response efforts that might be needed. For that purpose, the group 
maintains lists of Web sites and state emergency response/mitigation plans, 
because the organization believes that, “understanding plans capabilities and 
limitations of other stakeholders is key to building your own plan” (USNC IC, 
2009, p. 5). 
The JIACG has also provided information on DoD’s domestic security 
initiatives to non-DoD organizations. For example, USNORTHCOM supports law 
enforcement requests for assistance along the southwest border when a 
homeland defense threat is present. It is intended for these types of initiatives to 
be leveraged by other organizations, which may save on resources while 
providing unity of effort. In a similar vein, the JIACG can reach-back to other 
organizations inside the command; initiatives and experience along these lines 
may be of interest and potential support to Arctic region partners as well (USNC 
IC, 2009, p. 21). 
Likewise, the JIACG is interested in critical infrastructure protection, such 
as energy grid security, because mission assurance (for defense critical 




private sector. USNORTHCOM’s IC and JIACG have been working to better 
understand the private sector emergency response capabilities and how the USG 
fits within those response efforts.  
Additionally, the group has reached out to other “for profit” partners such 
as Wal-Mart's Business Emergency Operations Center, Walgreens Operations 
Center, Retail Industry Leaders Association, the Red Cross, National Volunteer 
Organizations National Governors Association, National Emergency 
Management Association, American Association of Railroad and others during 
operations (USNC IC, 2009, p. 9). This pre-event interaction and “inclusiveness” 
is important because during a contingency (especially considering the 
complicating factors in the Arctic) is not the time for first contact. These efforts 
are expected to help facilitate coordination of functional activities with agency 
partners in anticipation of requests for assistance in accordance with the National 
Response Framework (USNC IC JIACG Strategy, 2009, p. 4). 
The IC also works to integrate the private sector into exercises and 
sharing of best practices. In fact, the organization has drafted a Private Sector 
Engagement Marketing Plan that seeks to increase private sector participation in 
JIACG meetings, exercises and contingency operations, and develop strategic 
alliances nationally, internationally, and locally (Catalino, 2009, p. 3). Similarly, 
the objectives of the draft Private Sector Integration Implementation Plan are: 
enhanced collaboration with private sector partners; better understanding of the 
private sector requirements, capabilities and missions; enhanced understanding 
of USNORTHCOM’s capabilities and improved national level response to natural 
disasters and/or incidents of national significance (Catalino, 2009, p. 3). 
During an event, the IC intends to stand up an “Interagency Coordination 
Center” that works within the Homeland Security Information Network to push 
and pull information between partners. Members of the JIACG work to analyze 
interagency products like DHS's National Operations Center Daily Reports, 
Infrastructure Protection Reports and FEMA Daily Operations Briefing and 
Private Sector Daily Reports. They also review USGS/Department of Interior—
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Office of Emergency Management Daily Situation Reports (SITREPs), as well as 
SITREPs from other organizations such as Department of Transportation, 
Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, the Transportation 
Security Operations Center (Freedom Center), U.S. Coast Guard, non-
governmental organizations, the private sector and State Emergency Operations 
Centers (USNC IC, 2009, p.12). 
Similarly, the JIACG makes assessments for current operations, future 
operations and any issues that may be involved based on information from 
across these other agencies. The assessment shown in Figure 19 provides an 
understanding of the “big picture” of what is happening during an event.  
 
Figure 19.   JIACG Assessment Example (USNC IC, 2009, p. x) 
Another product that emerges from these analyses is the JIACG 
Assessment of Agency Deployments, which prioritizes the interagency 
assets/capabilities relevant to potential requests for assistance for DoD 
(similar/unique) capabilities (USNC IC, 2009, p. 18). Likewise, agencies can 
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request additional information from USNORTHCOM and push it back to their own 
organizations. How many are actually doing so has not been quantified.  
Admittedly, the information described thus far was provided by the 
USNORTHCOM JIACG staff. As noted in the Introduction, the intent of this 
researcher was to balance the model reviews with independent study of related 
scholarly documents. In this case, the recently released Government Accounting 
Office report on interagency coordination with regard to homeland defense and 
civil support missions highlighted where performance could be enhanced within 
DoD. These areas include: clearly defined roles and responsibilities, performance 
assessments of liaison personnel, reliance on personal relationships subject to 
rotation and an institutionalized approach to interagency coordination (GAO, 
2010, pp. 27, 33). The GAO document specifically mentions USNORTHCOM, 
finding:  
...NORTHCOM officials told us that they lack guidance on 
determining the appropriate number and selection of agencies from 
which they should be exchanging liaisons. Officials from ASD/HD 
acknowledged that DOD currently has a gap in its guidance for 
determining the appropriate number and selection of agencies and 
that it plans to issue such guidance in 2010. A DOD-wide staffing-
needs assessment would better position DOD to ensure the most 
appropriate and efficient exchange of liaisons between DOD 
entities and DOD’s federal partner agencies, and thus maximize the 
effectiveness of interagency coordination efforts. (GAO, 2010, p. 
27) 
Similarly, the document states that: 
Until position descriptions for liaisons are consistently established, 
roles and responsibilities for interagency coordination will continue 
to lack clear definition, and DOD will be unable to assess liaisons 
from a performance perspective. (GAO, 2010, p. 33) 
Based on the GAO’s report, it could be argued that although there is a lot 
of activity, the effectiveness of such activity and partnerships has yet to be 
measured. Similarly, the draft JIACG strategy/policies, after many years of 
operation, indicate that there still may not be clear organizational goals/objectives 
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available for measurement. Additionally, the group’s main focus is to provide 
informational planning for the Combatant Commander. This spotlight points 
towards a “one-way” pull of information from various systems to the leadership at 
USNORTHCOM. Even though the intent is to provide information back to the 
community, the amount/type of information in the form of relevant products, 
reports, etc. has not been determined, as evidenced by the GAO report. 
Gathering information, analyzing and providing relevant products back to the 
community would be of value to the Arctic region partners. 
At present, the USNORTHCOM JIACG is a functioning community that 
interacts with all levels of government and the private sector using developed 
processes and procedures. Taking the information as provided and completing 
the criterion matrix as shown in Table 8, USNORTHCOM’s JIACG appears to 
have attained a moderate-high degree of robustness, collaboration and 
information-sharing capabilities. However, in addition to a lack of prescribed 
measure of effectiveness for the personnel and products developed, on the 
surface, it appears that the group is primarily geared towards a “one way pull” of 
information, which may leave Arctic region partners wanting. 
Table 8.   JIACG Capability Analysis 
JIACG—Score 22/27 
Level of capability to meet the prescribed criterion 
 
Low/Minimal 
Score = 1 
Medium/Moderate 
Score = 2 
High  
Score = 3 
1 2 3 
Criterion 1.0  
Robustness:  
Resources, Policies, 
Political Acceptability  








Factors: Factors: Factors: 
1.1 Available resources 
(Personnel, funding, i.e., 
ability to sustain effort) 
2.1 Number of partners 
(few, some, many) 
3.1 Systems used 
(Portals/Networks) 
Score = 2 
Dedicated funding for staff; 
participating organizations 
voluntarily support with own 
Score = 3 
Many partners/stakeholders 
Score = 3 
Access to multiple 
collaborative systems; 
sharing information at 
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JIACG—Score 22/27 
Level of capability to meet the prescribed criterion 
 
Low/Minimal 
Score = 1 
Medium/Moderate 
Score = 2 
High  
Score = 3 
staff multiple levels 
1.2 Policies/Guidance 
(CONOPS, policy manuals, 
business rules, etc.) 
2.2 Variety of collaborators 
(Federal/State/Local/Private 
Sector) 
3.2 Processes for 
information 
sharing/dissemination 
(templates, forms, contact 
lists, databases, etc.) 
Score = 2 
Strategy in draft form 
Score = 3 
Partnering at all levels of 
government/private sector 
Score = 2 





1.3 Level of political 
acceptability (Level of 
support or opposition) 
2.3 Frequency of 
collaboration (daily, weekly, 
monthly) 
3.3 Standard Operating 
Procedures (e.g. 
instructions for collecting 
and disseminating 
information ) 
Score = 1 
Focus on Military; mainly 
information “pull”  
Score = 3 
Daily collaboration 
Score = 3 
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VI. ALASKA PARTNERSHIP FOR INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROTECTION (INFORMATION SHARING AND ANALYSIS 
CENTER CONSTRUCT) 
This chapter provides background information on the genesis of 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), which sets the stage for 
reviewing the Alaska Partnership for Infrastructure Protection (APIP) as the third 
and final model construct under review.  
The basis for ISAC models was the 1998 Presidential Decision 
Directive/National Security Council-63 (PDD-63) Critical Infrastructure Protection. 
This document “strongly encourage[s] the creation of a private sector information 
sharing and analysis center. The actual design and functions of the center...will 
be determined by the private sector, in consultation with and with assistance from 
the Federal Government” (White House, 1998). In many ways, ISACs provide a 
“fusing” function for critical infrastructure information. The general intent of PDD-
63 was for these ISACs to:  
…serve as the mechanism for gathering, analyzing, appropriately 
sanitizing and disseminating private sector information... about 
vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and anomalies...become a 
clearinghouse for information within and among the various sectors, 
and provide a library for historical data to be used be [sic] the 
private sector and, as deemed appropriate by the ISAC, by the 
government. Critical to the success of such an institution would be 
its timeliness, accessibility, coordination, flexibility, utility and 
acceptability. (White House, 1998) 
As stated in Chapter III, the National Strategy for Information Sharing 
acknowledged that 85 percent of the infrastructure and resources critical to the 
nation is in the hands of the private sector (White House, 2007, p. 4). Information 
sharing efforts in this area have been promoted by the multiple ISAC 
organizations that have expanded across various infrastructure sectors. Similar 
to the fusion center approach with the states, the federal government left the 
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design and operation of ISACs up to the private sector, offering support and 
coordination via public organizations that facilitated their interests. 
According to one of the founding members of APIP, the organization 
began in the absence of a standing ISAC post 9-11.9 The state of Alaska (SoA), 
Department of Defense (DoD) and a few private sector organizations met ad hoc 
to discuss the protection of critical infrastructure within the region. There was a 
need for integrated planning between the agencies, yet little forward movement 
was observed during these meetings. The private sector was concerned with 
competition and proprietary rules; DoD wanted to classify the information. 
Resistance to change and an unwillingness to consider alternate solutions were 
the main reasons the effort stalled.  
A select group decided that the private sector’s stake needed to be the 
focal point, since all Alaska critical infrastructure is either owned by or depends 
on the private sector for support. The private sector had to be convinced of the 
benefits of a shared, collaborative development process. The group considered a 
partnership as a means to combine the missions of government and the private 
sector into a collaborative alliance that could work toward a common homeland 
security objective. They emphasized breaking down the competitive forces that 
prevented information sharing and building a partnership that focused on 
preparing for anti-terrorism activities as a whole (Jensen, 2007, p. 3). 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term partnership is defined as: 
…a cooperative venture between the public and private sectors, 
built on the expertise of each partner that best meets clearly 
defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of 
resources, risks and rewards. (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003, p. 9) 
Likewise, collaboration means: 
…any joint activity by two or more organizations intended to 
increase public value by working together rather than separately. It 
is an interactive process involving an autonomous group of actors 
                                            
9 Personal discussion; historical documentation of this nature is not available. 
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who use shared rules, norms, or organizational structures to: solve 
problems, reach agreement, and undertake joint actions, share 
resources such as information, money, or staff. (Imperial, 2004, p. 
13) 
APIP was officially formed in November 2004 with an initial sponsorship of 
DoD, the SoA and several energy organizations that recognized the need to truly 
collaborate. It evolved from the critical infrastructure committee of the combined 
Federal/State Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council established after September 11 
and broadened the scope to “all-hazards” in order to leverage efforts. APIP’s 
mission is to “provide an integrated all hazards approach to disruptions, natural 
or man-made to critical infrastructure throughout the State of Alaska.” (APIP 
Handbook, 2009, p. 1). Basically, APIP is a community that coordinates 
information sharing among all participants in order to enhance group knowledge 
related to infrastructure interdependencies, during both routine and contingency 
events. This “big picture” (versus individual information collection efforts) enables 
decision making by providing situational awareness for all partners 
simultaneously.  
Initially, the two public organizations took on leadership roles with APIP 
membership recognizing that the SoA and DoD were better suited to provide the 
necessary personnel resources required to develop the organization. Likewise, 
both government organizations recognized that they would be on the receiving 
end of information; providing personnel and financial resources to research and 
develop courses of action was the government’s way of sharing the responsibility 
for infrastructure protection. Taking the lead in this way avoided one possible 
reason for failure, “a low general level of leadership talent or the lack of a ‘good 
government’ ethos” (Bardach, 2009, p. 106). 
APIP was up against the same political, administrative and technical 




All members were ultimately responsible for overcoming these conflicts, which as 
noted in A Manager’s Guide to Resolving Conflicts in Collaborative Networks, 
include:  
…identifying their own and their organization’s interests and needs 
in advance, as well as researching and thinking about the other 
parties’ interests and needs…focusing on creative solutions that 
address the procedural, substantive, and relationship (or 
psychological) needs of all the parties involved. (O’Leary & 
Bingham, 2007, p. 35) 
To meet these various expectations, partners (team members) had to find 
solutions, be open minded and willing to brainstorm options collaboratively. 
(Similar expectations will drive the Arctic region partners.) Initially, much of the 
information flow between APIP partners was ad hoc, informal and based on 
personal relationships, as shown in Figure 20 (Martin, 2007, p. 5). The challenge 
for APIP leadership was to persuade members to willingly share propriety data in 
order to build trust between competitors and regulators. The members also had 
to trust their government leaders in order to avoid a pitfall noted by the 
Government Accountability Office, “a lack of trust in DHS and fear that sensitive 
information would be released are recurring barriers to the private sector’s 
sharing information with the federal government…” (GAO, 2006, cover). 
APIP confronted disparate agency authorities, capabilities and information 
security by working through their partnership to develop memorandums of 
agreement before integrating processes and procedures. The organization 
developed a charter (co-chaired by leadership of SoA/DoD), which describes the 




Figure 20.   Past APIP Communication Example (From Martin, 2007, p. 5) 
 Information sharing / information management 
 Planning and response process improvement 
 Resource management / resource typing 
 Infrastructure sector characterization to understand vulnerabilities, 
dependencies, and single points of failure 
 Cyber security 
 Continuity of operations planning 
 Team building and partnering. (APIP Charter, 2009, p. 1) 
The above tasks would be accomplished by way of: 
 Conducting infrastructure analysis to determine sector 
vulnerabilities 
 Establishing infrastructure maps 
 Sharing infrastructure information with APIP partners and other 
parties as required 
 Providing a planning and response environment for critical 
infrastructure resource holders  
 Developing internal communications procedures 
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 Making recommendations for priorities of protection, support and 
recovery 
 Conducting various internal exercises and training opportunities 
(APIP Charter, 2009, p. 1)  
The group also involved academic cohorts to help develop a process 
model that would survive day-to-day infrastructure changes related to personnel, 
backup functions, asset maintenance, etc. Once a process was in place, the 
group began to conduct infrastructure threat analyses based on identification of 
assets, vulnerabilities and dependencies. They looked across the sectors to 
define critical vulnerability interdependencies. The partners conducted tabletop 
exercises using realistic threat scenarios to define additional homeland defense 
and homeland security gaps and seams. The result of these efforts was a 
comprehensive list of integrated protection priorities for responsible law 
enforcement authorities. (Such forward thinking and practical application of 
knowledge would be useful in supporting Arctic region partners as well.) 
It took years to develop the trust necessary for the partnership to allow 
government organizations to seek a collaborative solution that would respect 
proprietary data as well as solve information management and interoperable 
network issues impeding APIP’s collaborative mission requirements. Using the 
policies provided at the national level for guidance, APIP began to look at 
technological solutions to enhance collaboration. The leaders wanted to reduce 
the investment risk by adopting a framework that was already developed and 
supported by organizations at the state and federal level, providing value added 
for “cheap.” They were looking for real-time collaboration, reporting and chat, 
with a corresponding level of information security that was suitable to all 
partnership organizations. Since DHS was slated to be the primary point of 
contact for homeland security information sharing based on the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security, APIP leadership analyzed the DHS sponsored Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN).  
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Leaders discovered that HSIN was a ready-made collaborative tool that 
met their requirements and could also facilitate the gathering, analysis and 
distribution of relevant and actionable information needed to support their 
mission. The partners understood that they would still be required to invest their 
time by providing information, attending meetings and collaborating; technology 
would simply be a new means of sharing partnership data and knowledge. They 
also had to face a common challenge to effective data sharing: providing timely 
access to the right data in a usable format. Similarly, they recognized that 
collaboration also had to support performance management via standardized 
data collection and storage, shared databases and other technical resources 
(Imperial, 2004, p. 15). 
In 2007, APIP leaders proposed using the state of Alaska HSIN portal 
page with an initial communication goal: “develop a system of alerting and 
reporting that enhances coordination between member organizations, sector 
leadership, and government agencies and results in improved mission assurance 
of critical infrastructure within Alaska” (Imperial, 2004, p. 15). APIP went on to 
develop a separate page inside the portal that is for use by members only to 
ensure that proprietary data is protected. New members can request access via 
the co-chairs of the partnership. Figure 21 shows the variety of pre-built, 
standardized advisory and situation report formats (company/sector 
assessments/incident status summary, etc.) initially provided to all APIP 
members within HSIN.  
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Figure 21.   APIP HSIN Report Templates (From Martin, 2007, pp. 6-10) 
Over the years, these five reports were condensed to two based on 
feedback from the partners as shown in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22.   Incident Status Summary/Hazard Advisory Impact Assessment 
(From APIP, 2009, p. 12)  
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These APIP products cover initial reporting of incidents made by members 
that detail the event, its impact and response information (equivalent to the 
standard Incident Command System 209 form prescribed by FEMA.)  The 
Hazard Advisory provides information on man-made events, threat warnings and 
impact to the sector and other members. The target audience for these products 
includes both the members and DHS who can monitor via the APIP portal on 
HSIN. APIP leaders also revised the coordinated process flow for information 
and set up automatic alert notices to APIP members (Martin, 2008). Members 
still had to figure out how to solve problems collectively, using shared data and 
subject matter expertise; however, the building blocks to facilitate such action 
were also made available.  
In 2008, leaders provided refresher training with the goal that all 
participants understand how members “communicate with each other, select and 
fill out appropriate report template(s), effectively utilize HSIN and know how to 
get more information or assistance” (Jensen, 2008). In addition to developing 
processes for information sharing, they also developed handbooks for using the 
tool and continue to provide updates each year. Leaders provided partners with 
explicit guidance for data, reports and information flow to ensure collaboration 
and reduce frustration as shown in Figure 23 (APIP, 2009, p. 6). 
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Figure 23.   APIP Information Flow Responsibilities (From APIP, 2009, p. 6) 
APIP has used HSIN over the years with great success, despite several 
reports citing difficulties with the system. For example, in 2006, the OIG cited five 
major issues for DHS regarding HSIN: 1) a clearly defined relationship between 
HSIN and existing collaboration systems, 2) lack of user requirements, 3) no 
evaluation of releases prior to implementation, 4) lack of user guidance to include 
clear information-sharing processes, training, and reference materials, and 5) 
missing baseline and specific performance measures leading to inability to track 
or assess information sharing (DHS Office of the Inspector General [DHS OIG], 
2006, p. 3). The following year, GAO issued a report, stating DHS did not work 
effectively to:  
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…fully develop joint strategies and policies, procedures, and other 
means to operate across agency boundaries, which are key 
practices for effective coordination and collaboration and a means 
to enhance information sharing and avoid duplication of effort. 
(GAO, 2007, cover) 
In 2008, the DHS OIG issued a follow-up report on HSIN, making another 
five recommendations that included more resources, better stakeholder 
involvement/communication, developing scenario-based training, system 
performance/information-sharing metrics and defining/communicating 
information-sharing processes (DHS OIG, 2008, p. 1). Additionally, in 2008, GAO 
reported that DHS is acquiring a replacement system called Next Generation 
HSIN but has “not implemented key process controls in the areas of project and 
acquisition planning” (GAO, 2008, p. 2). GAO stated these processes include: 
developing a program office, requirements development and management, 
gathering, analyzing, and validating user requirements and risk management 
(GAO, 2008, p. 2). 
A review of issues and recommendations in each of these reports indicate 
mainly program and resource issues at the federal level that have not necessarily 
prohibited effective use of the system by proactive practitioners. In fact, from an 
APIP perspective, the tool has worked “as advertised.” Members have continued 
to use the system with the expectation that the federal government will continue 
to apply resources to protect users and their investment in the network. Likewise, 
members of the partnership see value in new features such as the HSIN-
Connect, which will allow APIP to expand outside the local area using real-time 
Webinar-type collaboration for meetings and events.10 
APIP members access their page inside the state portal each day (shown 
in Figure 24) and physically meet every third Thursday of the month during the 
APIP season, from September to May (APIP, 2009, p. ii). Partners have utilized 
the portal during real-world events that may impact infrastructure (power 
                                            
10 Information provided verbally from APIP chair. 
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outages, wildland fires, flooding, etc.) as well as during exercises using simulated 
threats. In fact, during a recent exercise, APIP members volunteered to 
participate in an exercise so they could provide additional reality to the scenario.  
 
Figure 24.   APIP Home Page (From APIP, 2009, p. 18)  
This routine collaboration and robust mutual interest has helped overcome 
the lack of dedicated funding. (Similar to the AKIAC and JIACG, salary for 
partners comes from each respective organization. The distinction between these 
organizations and APIP is that APIP is a collateral duty for participants.)   
According to members, the use of HSIN has supported the partnership for 
the past several years in four important ways.  
 Cost. HSIN provides an effective means to collaborate at little to no 
cost. The portal’s longevity is tied to Federal dollars, which are 
likely to last longer than local funding would, considering the current 
depth of state budget cuts. 
 Customization. The use of HSIN as a generic, standardized tool 
allowed members to create and retain their own specializations, 
meaning that expertise is not blended into a process that focuses 
on one sector over another.  Figure 25 highlights APIP’s ability to 
tailor the site for incident management. 
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Figure 25.   APIP Incident Management Page (From APIP, 2009, p. 19) 
 Automation. HSIN delivers automatic alert notices to APIP 
members so they can immediately collaborate on a new event. This 
relieves staff members of the requirement to routinely monitor other 
organization’s activities.  
 Simplicity. APIP members recognized that complexity is already 
woven through their combined effort; they would have rejected a 
more complicated collaborative tool. 
Over the years, the organizational makeup of APIP has grown to include 
communications, medical, oil refineries, emergency services, transportation, 
financial and water system sectors as shown in Figure 26. APIP members started 
attending Pacific Northwest Economic Region and Pacific Northwest Regional 




Figure 26.   2009 APIP Organization (From APIP, 2009, p. 2)  
APIP was also acknowledged in two 2006 state HLS strategy (AKSHSS) 
objectives:  
1) in partnership with Alaskan Command, continue to strengthen 
and extend the reach and influence of the Alaska Partnership for 
Infrastructure Protection (APIP) and, 
2) Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
continues to co-chair APIP and sector subcommittees, and the staff 
continues to assist APIP with development of communications 
plans, Emergency Operation Center (EOC) plans, exercise 
scenario development, exercise conduct and training. (State of 
Alaska, 2006, p. 4) 
Five years after APIP’s inception, the FEMA approved 2009 AKSHSS 
acknowledges the organization’s continued expansion by stating that, “APIP 
provides a forum for the public and private sectors to share information and 
develop strategy for continuity of services including energy, medical services, 
and other vital sectors” (State of Alaska, 2009, p. 4). A corresponding objective is 
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to “develop a system for APIP members (InfraGuard) to share and provide 
recommendations on cyber infrastructure protection measures (State of Alaska, 
2009, p. 14). Additionally, goal four of the AKSHSS is “strengthen information 
and intelligence sharing” with a corresponding objective to “continue to expand 
the use of the HSIN State portal” (State of Alaska, 2009, p. 15). Absent specific 
metrics, the growth, volunteerism, collaboration, products and daily use by 
members are indicators that the collective team believes their efforts are 
strengthening the resilience of the group as a whole. These are all value added 
propositions for Arctic policy partners. 
In summary, the core success of APIP seems to be pinned on the 
persistence of those who believed in the requirement to share in the 
responsibility of protecting the infrastructure and the ability to leverage the HSIN 
portal. The focus on infrastructure protection and closed/limited portal leads to a 
low score in political acceptability; however, the processes, procedures, 
templates, frequency of collaboration, variety of partners and ability to make 
assessments gives APIP an overall high score as noted in Table 9.  
Table 9.   APIP Capability Analysis 
APIP—Score 23/27 
Level of capability to meet the prescribed criterion 
Low/Minimal Medium/Moderate  High 
1 2 3 
Criterion 1.0  
Robustness:  
Resources, Policies, 
Political Acceptability  








1.1 Available resources 
(Personnel, funding, i.e., 
ability to sustain effort) 
2.1 Number of partners 
(few, some, many) 
3.1 Systems used 
(Portals/Networks) 





with own staff (collateral 
duty for all) 
Score = 3 
Many partners/stakeholders
Score = 3 
Use of HSIN collaborative 
system 
1.2 Policies/Guidance 2.2 Level of collaboration 3.2 Processes for information 
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APIP—Score 23/27 
Level of capability to meet the prescribed criterion 
Low/Minimal Medium/Moderate  High 
1 2 3 
Criterion 1.0  
Robustness:  
Resources, Policies, 
Political Acceptability  














(templates, forms, contact 
lists, databases, etc.) 
Score = 3 
Charter/Handbook  
Score = 3 
Partnering at all levels  
Score = 3 
Many tested processes, 
templates 
1.3 Political acceptability 
(Level of support or 
opposition) 
2.3 Frequency of 
collaboration (daily, weekly, 
monthly) 
3.3 Standard Operating 
Procedures (e.g. instructions 
for collecting and 
disseminating information ) 
Score = 1 
Limited to / focused on 
infrastructure protection 
Score = 3 
Daily collaboration 
Score = 3 







The hypothesis in Chapter I was that an Arctic “community of interest” 
could leverage one of three popular information-sharing models: fusion center, 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, or the Joint Interagency Coordination 
Group. Subsequent reviews were designed to determine which of the current 
working models was best suited based on the prescribed criterion. A recap of the 
outcome of these reviews and total scores assigned to each model is shown in 
Table 10.  
 100
Table 10.   Capability Analysis Summary 
Model and Final Score Summary (AKIAC=19 / JIACG=22 / APIP=23) 
Level of capability to meet the prescribed criterion  
Low/Minimal 
Score = 1 
Medium/Moderate 
Score = 2 
High  
Score = 3 
1 2 3 
Criterion 1.0  
Robustness:  
Resources, Policies, 
Political Acceptability  








Factors: Factors: Factors: 
1.1 Available resources 
(Personnel, funding, i.e., 
ability to sustain effort) 
2.1 Number of partners 
(few, some, many) 
3.1 Systems used 
(Portals/Networks) 
FC          1 FC  2 FC  3 
JIACG   2 JIACG  3 JIACG   3 
APIP      1 APIP    3 APIP     3 
1.2 Policies/Guidance 
(CONOPS, policy manuals, 
business rules, etc.) 
2.2 Variety of collaborators 
(Federal/State/Local/Private 
Sector) 
3.2 Processes for 
information 
sharing/dissemination 
(templates, forms, contact 
lists, databases, etc.) 
FC          2 FC  2 FC  2 
JIACG   2 JIACG  3 JIACG   2 
APIP      3 APIP    3 APIP     3 
1.3 Level of political 
acceptability (Level of 
support or opposition) 
2.3 Frequency of 
collaboration (daily, weekly, 
monthly) 
3.3 Standard Operating 
Procedures (e.g. 
instructions for collecting 
and disseminating 
information ) 
FC          1 FC  3 FC  2 
JIACG   1 JIACG  3 JIACG   3 
APIP      1 APIP    3 APIP     3 
The results show that there is less than a 10 percent difference between 
two of the models, and approximately 20 percent between the lowest and highest 
scores. These indicators suggest that a significant difference does not exist. In 
fact, all three models provide a certain amount of robustness, collaborative 
capability/partnerships and developed information-sharing processes. Likewise, 
all three models are weak in the area of “political acceptability,” the level of 
support or opposition; meaning the degree to which “outside” organizations 
(other potential stakeholders) were included in the model’s operational construct.  
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In each case the models were found to operate within their original 
domains or scopes of effort, which currently include law enforcement, natural 
disaster planning and infrastructure protection. This is likely due in part to the 
lack of specific mandates in the national and organizational level strategies. In 
other words, because these documents are not entirely prescriptive, a great deal 
of leeway exists for organizations to create partnerships and conduct information 
sharing as desired. Such freedom lets agencies tailor their needs to internally 
defined requirements and continue to “do business as usual.” In hindsight, these 
results are a natural phenomenon that should not be too surprising. 
While all three models advertise an inclusive approach to “all hazards” 
information sharing, it could be concluded that the AKIAC (fusion center) remains 
focused mainly on processing law enforcement/criminal data since only law 
enforcement personnel currently support that model. Likewise, APIP is focused 
on infrastructure protection and the JIACG on events impacting the private sector 
that could require a USNORTHCOM response. In general, none of the models 
are inclusive of all the hazards/domains necessary to capture the relevant data 
that would contribute to Arctic situational awareness. (While the national 
Information Sharing Environment envisioned pulling all domains/hazards into one 
collective setting, the full implementation of this effort remains to be seen.) 
In essence, the hypothesis is false because none of the models provides a 
more complete “off the shelf” capability for use by Arctic partners/stakeholders 
than the others. More importantly however, the analysis reveals another 
dimension not fully considered in the criteria, which is the limited exposure each 
model has with respect to many of the DIMES entities. As described in the 
literature review, in addition to the military, information provided by the diplomatic 
(international partners/DoS), informational, (scientists/researchers/media) and 
economic (oil companies/shipping) entities would be necessary to develop full 
situational awareness in the Arctic. With the current limited focus of all three 
models, a significant amount of information relevant to Arctic homeland 
security/defense missions would be missing if any were to be adopted in their 
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current state of organizational existence. In other words, the ability to protect and 
secure the Arctic requires a complete image of the region; this would not be the 
case if any of the subject models were chosen.  
It could be argued that these missing “stakeholders” (remaining DIMES 
entities) maintain a significant portion of the resident Arctic knowledge. The open 
source information that flows between these organizations would fill a 
tremendous gap in situational awareness of the Arctic community of interest. As 
one scholarly document claims, “It is important to not view information as a 
commodity; a better analogy would be that intelligence provides a nourishing 
meal, but open source information is the air that analysts breathe” (Henry L. 
Stimson Center, 2008, p. 42). In other words, those supporting defense/security 
will also need access to the information provided by the outlying contributors (all 
stakeholders) in order to be successful.  
In summary, protecting the complex Arctic region requires an inclusive 
approach in order to provide full situational awareness. Such a community would 
support all the partners/stakeholders that provide, collect and produce 
information and products that contribute to Arctic security. The three models 
reviewed could be utilized as part of a larger community supporting Arctic policy. 
Three recommendations for building and sustaining such a community are 
provided below.  
A. RECOMMENDATION 1. AN APPROPRIATE “CATALYST/CHAMPION” 
MUST PROMOTE A VALUE ADDED, INCLUSIVE INFORMATION 
SHARING “MEGACOMMUNITY”  
By design, this researcher does not specify a person or organization as 
“the right one” to become the catalyst/champion(s) to develop an Arctic 
information sharing megacommunity of interest. Such a catalyst could in fact 
come from any number of stakeholders and/or equity partners. He/she (they) will 
intuitively recognize that an inclusive community offering more value than what is 
currently being produced by individual organizations is needed. 
 103
Figure 27 depicts a strategy canvas that could be used by the 
catalyst/champion to describe the enhanced value proposition as well as 
expected innovations that would lead to an increase in Arctic situational 
awareness.  
 
Figure 27.   Strategy Canvas for Information Sharing in Support of Arctic 
Region Policy (After Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 25) 
Leveraging the canvas examples provided in Blue Ocean Strategy, the 
approach for Arctic Region Policy Information Sharing is described in the next 
three sections (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005). 
1. Eliminate/Reduce 
In the upper left corner of the strategy is a description of what needs to be 
eliminated and reduced based on the current situation (fractured Arctic Policy 
implementation—no existing, coherent strategy for sharing information). For 
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example, the strategy requires eliminating overlapping efforts that consume 
similar resources. In other words, the common and interdependent homeland 
security/defense issues would be discovered and documented for action, leading 
to a better understanding of the threats to the region. Likewise, a reduction in the 
amount of currently stovepiped (sharable) information and subject matter 
expertise would be released to provide value added for all members, leading to a 
more complete picture of the environment. Existing individual information 
collection efforts could be leveraged to build a shared knowledge base that 
supports all contributing organizations.  
2. Raise/Create 
The canvas continues with a description of raising awareness between all 
partners/stakeholders. This includes an understanding of capabilities, limitations, 
requirements and interests of each organization that could lead to an 
appreciation of “interconnectedness.” As noted in one study, successful inter-
organizational collaborative capacity includes, “...having a common goal or 
recognized interdependence...establishing and addressing goals for collaboration 
and considering the interest of other agencies in planning (Jansen, Hocevar, 
Rendon, Thomas, 2008, p. 13). 
Discovering sympathetic relationships between organizations would 
naturally lead to the creation or “mashup” of an Arctic megacommunity that 
includes all the partners/stakeholders with an interest in securing the region. The 
authors of Megacommunities describe this concept as:  
…a public sphere in which organizations from three sectors—
business, government, and civil society—deliberately joined 
together around compelling issues of mutual importance, following 
a set of practices and principles that make it easier for them to 
achieve results without sacrificing their individual goals. 
(Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, Kelly, 2008, p. 53) 
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3. Grid 
The bottom half of the graphic depicts how the two approaches map 
against the canvas. The status quo (current way of doing business) rates high 
with regard to interest in each specific discipline, individual organizational goals 
and individual subject matter expertise but drops dramatically, and in fact, stops 
before true collaboration begins. Likewise, the megacommunity approach is low 
initially because it minimizes individual aspects, adding value progressively as it 
moves towards incorporating shared portals, databases and products that 
contribute to situational awareness.  
4. Megacommunity 
While a natural tension is to be expected between the sectors based on 
organizational perspectives, building a megacommunity would bring 
organizations toward a shared sense of impact when/if something does go awry 
in the region. In other words, this complex, adaptive community would be in a 
continuous symbiotic learning cycle. These collective efforts will lead to shared 
resiliency—the ability of the community to absorb the impact of events, displacing 
individual, disconnected reactions. Likewise, based on a collaborative history, 
genuine commitment towards protecting the region would ultimately prevail over 
individual interests such as what the APIP organization experienced over several 
years of building habitual working relationships.   
5. Value Innovation 
A collective strategy would focus on collaborative contributions using a 
common portal and shared information databases that guide the development of 
effective, useful products. This may lead to challenges of sorting through 
volumes of constantly changing data, some immaterial or ambiguous. However, 
much of this could be negated by a development and understanding of proper 
procedures/utilization of information technology tools. Ultimately, a communal  
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knowledge base would be of value far beyond each individual contributor, 
ensuring a more secure environment that also satisfies Arctic region policy 
requirements.  
The initial catalysts/champions would begin this process by defining the 
known equity partners and stakeholders from the tri-sectors. The first list would 
not be exhaustive and expected to grow as the community builds. A grid such as 
this would provide a framework within which the leaders could begin to map out 
the first members of the target community. This type of charting reminds leaders 
that protecting the Arctic will require information from many sources, in addition 
to the standard complement of governmental organizations such as DoD, DHS, 
and the state of Alaska. An example of initial importance and relevance of 
potential organizations is depicted in Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28.   Building the Arctic Region Megacommunity (From Gerencser, Lee, 
Napolitano, Kelly, 2008, p. 131) 
In fact, the governmental organizations fall in the lower right quadrant of 
the graph as “more relevant” with regard to information needs due to their 
preventing and/or responding missions if an event occurs. By virtue of 
understanding the environment through science and daily operations, the 
 107
organizations depicted in the upper right are more important with regard to 
information sharing based on their subject matter expertise. This approach lines 
up with the elements of a knowledge base: understand the current knowledge 
(who has it), find out what we need to know and work on closing the gap between 
what we know and what we need to know (Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 147). 
The grid includes the media since reporting on all aspects, whether 
economic, military, transportation or homeland security/defense will almost 
certainly be visible at a global level. As noted in the introduction, much of the 
national and homeland security political/military information on the Arctic is 
arriving via media reports. Shaping the informational environment with regard to 
Arctic policy partners/stakeholders internal and external interests may at times be 
in the hands of the media. Examples such as the sensational 2009 British tabloid 
Mail Online headline, The Coldest War: Russia and U.S. Faceoff over Arctic 
Resource, would not necessarily support the interests of the 
partners/stakeholders in the Arctic.  
Likewise, including the mainstream public and environmentalist interests 
allows for information flow that is not necessarily resident with the “usual” 
partners and stakeholders. Such diversity would incorporate other perspectives 
and possibilities that would otherwise be ignored (Gorman, 2010). The authors of 
Megacommunities, highlight other reasons to include non-traditional members:   
…the civil sector brings accountability, insight into how to get things 
done locally, sensitivity to how the issues at play might affect 
individuals in the environment, and credibility in arenas in which 
business and government fall short. (Gerencser et al., 2008, p. 67) 
As captured throughout this thesis, there are various organizations with 
vested interests in securing the Arctic. Each of these organizations is currently 
driven by political agendas and cultural/organizational motivation, inwardly 
focused on processes, and information collection/production. Similar to how the 
original stakeholders/partners will be mapped, the power and interest levels of 
each of these organizations will also need to be determined.  
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The power versus interest grid shown in Figure 29 provides a similar 
framework within which Arctic megacommunity leaders can determine where and 
at what level organizations may be expected to participate in the community. 
However, the true “power” resides in the community as a whole since none of the 
organizations will have all the answers or understand “how it is” given the 
complexity and constantly changing Arctic environment.  
 
Figure 29.   Arctic Region Power vs. Interest Grid (After Gerencser et al.,  
2008, pp. 124–138) 
In addition to tri-sector engagement and overlapping vital interests, there 
also needs to be convergence, structure and adaptability (Gerencser et al., 
2008). In this case, convergence means a commitment toward building security 
in the region. The community must take into account that the sectors may have 
different interests (proprietary/classified) that need to be respected. In other 
words, requirements will be dictated according to each organization’s specific 
interests. Overall development of the community (“the plan”) will come from the 
collective group to ensure an actionable strategy that includes implementable 
goals, milestones, protocols and principles that will benefit the entire community.  
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The community could operate under a simple structure initially, growing 
and adapting to new members and topics of interest, with follow-on planning for 
events, exercises, discussions and recurring (virtual) meetings that enhance the 
situational awareness of all members. Such up front activities would also allow 
organizations to become familiar with each other, helping to reduce the stress 
related to those partners who will be required to respond when/if an event occurs 
in the Arctic. As noted in the Psychology of Terrorism, “Extensive joint planning in 
conjunction with teamwork activity involving collaborating agencies can reduce 
the risk of experiencing adverse stress outcomes, particularly when responding 
in a multiagency context (Bongar, Brown, Beutler, Breckenridge, & Zimbardo, 
2007, p. 239). 
Finally, the group should consider how the communication network will be 
structured. The community could then take advantage of an information-sharing 
portal that would allow development of virtual connections using wikis, blogs, 
online forums and other social media tools. This would allow for the complete 
capture of the open source information-sharing capability that could be used 
during both routine and crisis operations. For example, the use of a tool such as 
the Ushahidi platform that “allows anyone to gather distributed data via SMS, e-
mail or Web and visualize it on a map or timeline...to create the simplest way of 
aggregating information from the public for use in crisis response” (Ushahidi, 
2010). Of course, leaders must take into account that some organizations may 
seek a totally open environment, while others may look for usernames and 
passwords to protect sensitive and/or proprietary information. Ultimately, the 
network needs will be based on member requirements and shaped to grow and 
adapt as the community expands.  
B. RECOMMENDATION 2. USING AGREED UPON GOALS, TRUSTED 
LEADERS SHOULD FURTHER DEVELOP AND OPTIMIZE THE 
MEGACOMMUNITY’S INTERESTS 
Once the Arctic megacommunity strategy is promoted by the 
catalyst/champion, the developed goals need to be supported and promoted by a 
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trusted leader. As noted by the author of The Speed of Trust, “world-class” trust 
consists of “...high collaboration and partnering, effortless communication, 
positive, transparent relationships with employees and all stakeholders, fully 
aligned systems and structures, strong education, engagement, confidence, and 
loyalty” (Covey, 2006, p. 24).  
Such assurance must be inspired by leaders trusted at both personal and 
professional levels; those who arouse organizational trust for the entire 
community. A credible leader exuding integrity and appropriate intent will 
motivate Arctic megacommunity members to create value for each other; this in 
turn will cause production of something worthwhile that benefits the global 
citizenship. The leaders will also inspire subject matter expert working groups, 
increasing community value as problems are solved collectively. Those with 
opposing views will be encouraged to make their claims freely, knowing that 
leaders will consider their opinions and facts equally as part of the decision-
making process.  
Leaders will lightly shepherd this decentralized organization, encouraging 
members to contribute regularly and accurately. Such a construct allows for 
power distribution among all members, further encouraging development of a 
team/collective knowledge base. As noted by the authors of Starfish and the 
Spider, such an independent and autonomous organization (Arctic 
megacommunity) will resemble a circle without the hierarchy of centralized 
organizations (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 88). Being part of this circle 
means that, “once you join, you're an equal. It's then up to you to contribute to 
the best of your ability” (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 88). The interest and 
curiosity of the members will naturally drive community development. Good 
leaders will know when/where/how to “guide” the community as necessary and 
step back as members usher the organization towards its goals. 
Guided by respected leaders, this open community will not rate one 
member at a higher level than another. In doing so, the inherent freedom will 
allow those participating to follow decided upon group norms in favor of more 
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rigid rules that accompany a typical centralized organization. Likewise, “when 
you give people freedom, you get chaos, but you also get incredible creativity” 
(Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, p. 81). Such creativity/diversity will also support an 
innovative Arctic region defense that will look to not only keep pace, but gain on 
adversaries as they adapt to the changing environment. Trusted, flexible, “hands 
off” leaders will encourage community growth and added situational awareness 
for all members. Ultimately, those needing to protect the Arctic will be able to 
leverage these cultivated relationships and a library of information built by all 
megacommunity members. As noted in The Age of the Unthinkable, “This kind of 
self-organization, the ability to pull off an ‘all hands on deck’ reaction, exists in 
many of the most efficient and resilient systems in our world” (Ramo, 2009, p. 
237). 
In addition to trust, it will be a mutual ideology and stewardship that keeps 
the Arctic megacommunity focused on sustaining the organization. Collective 
interests and knowledge will also help relieve any contentious issues that arise. 
As long as the organization provides value added, members will continue to 
produce and seek to grow the community by pursuing additional relevant 
partners. If necessary, these online relationships can also be calculated. As 
described in Measuring Public Relationships, the successful use of social media 
can be quantified to a degree by reviewing data such as how many visits are 
made and how long the pages are viewed (Paine, 2007, p. 125). Likewise, 
counting the volume of conversations and number of comments could provide 
insight into how well a specific blog is received (Paine, 2007, p. 127). Several 
professional services are available to help review the quantity and quality of the 
online activity if the megacommunity believes that such statistics are value 
added.  
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C. RECOMMENDATION 3. LEVERAGE THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS 
AND CAPABILITIES OF THE INFORMATION SHARING MODELS 
REVIEWED 
Leveraging the existing law enforcement partnerships of the Alaska 
Information Analysis Center, private sector subject matter experts in the Alaska 
Partnership for Infrastructure Protection and reachback to mission partners and 
other DoD organizations, provided by USNORTHCOM’s Joint Interagency 
Coordination Group, could provide an initial boost in supporting the Arctic 
megacommunity.  
For example, the AKIAC could pull information from the common portal, 
analyze and combine it with releasable intelligence that could be provided back 
to the community as products. Similarly, APIP has experience in developing 
portals, products, processes and procedures as well as relationships with many 
organizations that have an interest in the Arctic. Indeed, as existing partners, BP 
and ConocoPhillips would likely be major players in the megacommunity. As 
noted previously, the ties of these two organizations to the local communities go 
well beyond their status as simply “oil companies.” 
Likewise, as co-chair of APIP, the state of Alaska has developed 
connections to the native/tribal communities, who would also be major 
stakeholders in the megacommunity. Finally, the JIACG could provide 
information (policies, studies, exercises, etc.) and support from co-located 
organizations (established mission partners and other DoD organizations such as 
North American Aerospace Defense, missile defense agencies, etc.) to the Arctic 
megacommunity.  
It should be noted that leveraging the “best practices” of these three 
organizations will require a better understanding of what each of those practices 
may be. The intent would be to use the momentum gained by each to jump start 
the megacommunity instead of reinventing some of the wheels. As noted by the 
author of Smart Practices Research, “treat the risks and uncertainties involved in 
adopting some seemingly smart practice as being on a par with the uncertainties 
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associated with all the other alternatives under consideration (Bardach, 2009, p. 
109).  In this case, with no other alternatives under consideration, leveraging 
these existing models would allow catalysts/leaders to begin by taking into 
account some relevant practices. 
Finally, a recent scholarly article by a Nobel peace prize author on multi-
scale approaches to climate change/collective action problems sums up the 
benefits of creating a self-organized community: 
A large number of variables increase the likelihood that self-
organization could be effective in solving collective action problems. 
Among the most important are the following: (1) reliable information 
is available about the immediate and long-term costs and benefits 
of actions; (2) the individuals involved see the common resource as 
important for their own achievements and have a long-term time 
horizon; (3) gaining a reputation for being a trustworthy reciprocator 
is important to those involved; (4) individuals can communicate with 
at least some of the others involved; (5) informal monitoring and 
sanctioning is feasible and considered appropriate; and (6) social 
capital and leadership exist, related to previous successes in 
solving joint problems... The crucial factor is that a combination of 
structural features leads many of those affected to trust one 
another and to be willing to do an agreed-upon action that adds to 
their own short-term costs because they do see a long-term benefit 
for themselves and others and they believe that most others are 
complying. (Ostrom, 2010) 
D. CONCLUSION 
The 2009 Arctic Region Policy highlights the need to develop capabilities 
to protect U.S. air, land and sea borders, military/civilian vessels and aircraft, 
maritime commerce, critical infrastructure and key resources. The size and 
complexity of operating in this region was revealed in earlier chapters using a 
lens of economic, political/military and scientific activities and interest. Current 
information-sharing models are neither broad nor inclusive enough to support the 
level of effort necessary to provide full situational awareness. The ability to 
protect the Arctic will require information contribution from all partners and 
stakeholders, not just those traditionally thought of as security providers.  
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In essence, Arctic security is a “collective action/joint problem.” In the case 
of the megacommunity, once built, each organization will become familiar with 
ongoing issues in the region by way of access to reliable information. The 
megacommunity portal will become a trusted, common resource. Through this 
continuum of trust and shared knowledge, partners/stakeholders will invest in 
sustaining the effort. Participants will view the community as “their” resource, not 
something owned by any one organization, which will be another reason to 
contribute. The communication openness via freedom of input will enhance the 
value and when necessary, could be “informally monitored” by trusted leaders.  
As previously stated, the intent of this chapter was twofold: 
1. To inform the reader why the three existing information-sharing 
models fall short of supporting the partners/stakeholders in the 
complex Arctic region and,  
2. To lay out recommendations for a way ahead, including a draft 
strategy.  
Per the three recommendations made earlier, initial catalysts and 
subsequent leaders must create an Arctic megacommunity, leveraging existing 
models, partnerships, subject matter experts and all other organizations 
interested in Arctic region security. This community, particularly those with 
existing Arctic subject matter expertise, will be responsible for developing a plan 
of action/goals based on either the draft provided here or possibly their own 
strategic vision. This is a necessary and expected outcome of the inclusive 
megacommunity that forms. Only after considering all input and developing those 
goals (nourished by trusted leaders) will the collective group provide, collect and 
produce the information necessary for those expected to protect and defend the 
region.  
Figure 30 provides a summary of what this community might look like. In 
the upper left is a diagram highlighting the overarching theme of 
“provide/collect/produce,” which intersects the functions supported by each 
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participating organization. In other words, organizations are expected to 
contribute so that information flows between each action circle. 
(Provide/input into the community, Collect other data/information from the 
community, Produce some type of useful product back to the community.) 
 
Figure 30.   Information Sharing Strategy Summary 
Surrounding the white “cloud of collaboration/portal” are the partners and 
stakeholders, clustered around the DIMES theme. The gray arrows show input 
collected from the partners/stakeholders going into the cloud. Inside the cloud 
are the collective actions that organizations may contribute to, depending upon 
their interests. For example, one organization may provide the shipping 
schedules for all traffic in the Arctic or the most recent climate survey. Another 
may contribute a database of all the types of ships that could traverse the Arctic 
or provide maps, so that in the event of a rescue, the community members would 
know what support they might need to provide to a response effort. Likewise, 
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scientists and the U.S. Coast Guard could blog their continental shelf mapping 
adventures or the community could construct a wiki that builds situational 
awareness for any number of Arctic areas of interest. As the community grows, 
natural themes will develop out of collaboration that will be recognized and 
supported by other participants.  
The graphic also shows how the three models reviewed can extract 
data/information from the cloud to create products, which can then be 
reintroduced to the community in some fashion, depending upon the type of 
information contained. For example, the AKIAC could take a spot report provided 
by a community or ship, and combine that information with a related suspicious 
activity report and provide that product back to the community in an appropriate 
format. APIP could function similarly with an infrastructure report that might affect 
a response capability in the event of a ship in distress. Similarly, that partnership 
could provide specific infrastructure information to a community shouldering the 
Arctic that may need temporary support capabilities. These are examples of 
constructive ways that, as part of the community, the models, and other outside 
groups can cross-collaborate to minimize duplication of effort.  
It has been made apparent that much of the data/information necessary to 
support situational awareness currently exists in many stovepipes. It will be up to 
the partners/stakeholders to migrate those “silos of expertise” into a 
megacommunity that will support the collective “intelligence” needed to protect 
the Arctic region. The resulting situational awareness picture will enable all 
responsible agencies to better defend the Arctic region and thus comply with the 
2009 policy. The latest National Security Strategy hints at the importance of such 
a diverse, inclusive megacommunity to tie together all U.S. Arctic interests: 
The United States is an Arctic Nation with broad and fundamental 
interests in the Arctic region, where we seek to meet our national 
security needs, protect the environment, responsibly manage 
resources, account for indigenous communities, support scientific 
research, and strengthen international cooperation on a wide range 
of issues. (White House, 2010, p. 50) 
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Likewise, the President of the United States describes how we must 
strengthen our national capacity via a “whole of government approach” (White 
House, 2010, p. 14). This way ahead is focused particularly on building a 
“resilient” nation through both public and private sectors, and includes the 
strength of the general population as well. This approach is described further as: 
The ideas, values, energy, creativity, and resilience of our citizens 
are America’s greatest resource. We will support the development 
of prepared, vigilant, and engaged communities and underscore 
that our citizens are the heart of a resilient country. And we must 
tap the ingenuity outside government through strategic partnerships 
with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, 
foundations, and community-based organizations. Such 
partnerships are critical to U.S. success at home and abroad, and 
we will support them through enhanced opportunities for 
engagement, coordination, transparency, and information sharing. 
(White House, 2010, p. 16) 
In conclusion, this thesis examined three currently existing information-
sharing models to determine which would work best to achieve situational 
awareness for a broad array of Arctic partners and stakeholders. The thesis' 
research and analysis shows that no model is sufficient or stand-alone; rather a 
megacommunity is necessary, consisting of all equity partners (DoD, DoS, DHS, 
state of Alaska, etc.), interfacing with the stakeholders (researchers, private 
sector, media, etc.) and managed by leaders that will motivate the community to 
achieve a high degree of awareness for Arctic activity. Ultimately, protecting the 
complex Arctic environment and securing the top of the world will require a 
bottom’s up approach with participation from all partners and stakeholders. The 
next step is a call to action for a champion to take the lead, using this research 
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